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Abstract
Reasoning under uncertainty is a human capacity that in software system is nec-
essary and often hidden. Argumentation theory and logic make explicit non-
monotonic information in order to enable automatic forms of reasoning under
uncertainty. In human organization Distributed Cognition and Activity Theory
explain how artifacts are fundamental in all cognitive process. Then, in this thesis
we search to understand the use of cognitive artifacts in an new argumentation
framework for an agent-based artificial society.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Relevance
Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) paradigm provides the instruments to represent and
manage complex systems characterized by the presence of autonomously inter-
acting and possibly heterogeneous entities. Following A&A meta-model a MAS
is generally composed of computational entities of two sorts: agents and artifacts.
An agent is an autonomous and proactive computational entity situated in an en-
vironment. An artifact is a reactive, non-autonomous computational entity that
reacts to interaction events generating by agents or other artifacts, or changes of
the environment.
In the context of complex software systems argumentation theory is require-
ment in applications that involve both theoretical and practical aspects of artificial
intelligence and computer science. The Argumentation-based techniques range
from non-monotonic reasoning, knowledge engineering to MAS communication,
legal reasoning and alternative dispute resolution systems.
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An agent-based society similar a human society could exploit cognitive artifact
to support cognitive processes. The join among artifact abstraction and argumen-
tation theory is an useful ground of research in order to build an intelligent multi-
agent system. The artifacts could bring at architecture level some useful features
of argumentation, enabling an easier composition of intelligent applications.
In this thesis we investigate the possibility to build cognitive artifact based
on argumentation. We provide a model of argumentation exploitable by agents
and artifacts. The capacity to build cognitive argumentation artifacts usable from
agents opens new prospective to design MAS in direction to obtain intelligent ar-
tificial societies. For instance an automatic Alternative Dispute Resolution system
could be obtained from such features.
The following critical questions the thesis aims at giving a response to under-
line the relevance of the thesis in both sectors of argumentation and multi-agent
systems.
• Which general architecture can be developed for specifying communication
and coordination among agent based on argument?
• Which argumentation framework could be exploited to implement multi-
agent argumentation systems?
• Which general formalization could be exploited for an intelligent and auto-
matic dialog mediation?
• Which general architecture could be exploited to realize Alternative and
Online Dispute Resolution systems?
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• How can an Alternative and Online Dispute Resolution systems be imple-
mented in an agent society?
1.2 Thesis outline
This thesis goes from theoretic to practical studies. Table 1.1 shows the three se-
quence steps of thesis work: theory, model and coding with the respective results.
We start from a theorization of an argumentation system based on first order logic
representation. Moreover, we study the argument-based communication, defining
a formal dialog system where we exploit a process algebra representation and the
previous definition of arguments.
In the second step we design a model for multi-agent argumentation system.
We express the desidered set of functionalities in order to exploit argumentation
inside an agent society with two purposes: 1) enabling dialog based on arguments
and 2) enabling coordination based on argument. To satisfy the requirements fol-
lowing A&A meta-model we propose two type of artifacts: Co-Argumentation
Artifact and Dialog Artifact that encapsulate all the functionalities necessary to
build intelligent agent societies. The artifacts have the role of intelligent me-
diators that automatically can make some inference operations helpful to agent
coordination and communication.
The finally step is the implementation of the abstractions. To do that we exploit
TuCSoN infrastructure for agent society programming the artifact by ReSpecT
and Prolog languages. The reactive architecture of TuCSoN infrastructure is the
winning strategy to build complicate software such as MAS, that impose a right
scalable and flexible architecture. We foresee an ADR application scenario fitting
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our theory, model and coding very well. This case study could be considered as a
validation of the thesis work.
Table 1.1: Map of thesis contents
Theory Argumentation System (AS) Dialog System (DS)
Model Co-Argumentation Artifcat (CAA) Dialog Artifact (DA)
Code TuCSoN TuCSoN
Case Study Argument Acceptance Persuasion Dialog
4
Chapter 2
On Argumentation System
In this chapter are introduced argumentation theory and some open issue about
argumentation. In the actual intelligent software systems closed to final user it is
useful to have a representation of the uncertain and a system of communication
both close to human. We focus our attention on the formalization of an Argu-
mentation System (AS) to build non-monotonic knowledge, and a Dialog System
(DS) to enable communication.
2.1 Argumentation Theory
Argumentation theory went up again 2,500 years old, to the time of Plato and Aris-
totle in Athens. The arts of communicating in public forums and persuasion were
very important abilities for the Athenian government. Aristotle introduced the
study of rhetoric that is generally understood to be the art or technique of persua-
sion through the use of oral, visual or written language. Argumentation is a part of
the study of rhetoric in particular: how to create and present good arguments that
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could be logically accepted. Argumentation is a form of communication, where
at least one person supports the claims with evidences and reasoning. But it could
also be a form of knowledge representation, where the relevant arguments lead to
alternative, conflicting conclusions.
A society mainly evolves through interaction and communication among par-
ticipating entities. Within a society, people argue in order to solve problems, to
reduce conflicts, to exchange information and to inform each other of some per-
tinent facts. Argumentation is a useful feature of human intelligence that enables
us to deal with incomplete and inconsistent information. People usually have only
partial knowledge about the world (they are not omniscient) and often they have
to manage conflicting information. In the same way, the entities that compose
an artificial society should be able to deal with partial and conflicting knowledge.
Correspondingly, an agent-based model for an artificial society should provide an
adequate definition of knowledge with the purpose of providing a realistic reflec-
tion of a society. Also, it may be useful to share information in order to success-
fully deal with partial knowledge.
Actually, Argumentation or Argumentation Theory is a formal discipline within
artificial intelligence, where the aim is to make a computer assist in or perform
the act of argumentation. In addition, argumentation is used to provide a proof-
theoretic semantics for non-monotonic logic, starting with the influential work of
Dung (1995). Computational argumentation systems have found particular appli-
cation in domains where formal logic and classical decision theory are unable to
capture the richness of reasoning, domains such as law and medicine.
Argumentation is an important feature of human intelligence: the ability to
understand and manipulate arguments is fundamental to understand a new prob-
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lem, reason about actions and perform scientific research. Typically an argument
is a sequence of inferences leading to a valid conclusion: a set of arguments is
managed by an argumentation component that is particularly useful in the case of
conflicting information.
Argumentation systems are now being applied for developing application in
legal systems, negotiation among agents decision making etc. Argumentation is
strictly connected with logic and reasoning. It makes use of formal and informal
logic to enable reasoning and represent arguments. The study of logical form also
includes the study of how premises should lead to conclusions assuming that the
premises are correct. Informal logic is the study of reasoning from evidence to
conclusions. The study of argumentation actually involves formal and informal
logic.
Argumentation systems are a way to formalize non-monotonic reasoning, such
as constructing and comparing arguments for and against certain conclusions. The
idea is: the construction of an argument is monotonic and the non-monotonicity is
expressed in term of interaction between conflicting arguments. An other view of
inference under uncertainty leads to probabilistic argumentation system, that is the
join between classic logic and probability theory. An argument can be seen such
as a chain of possible events (premises) that makes the hypothesis (conclusions)
true. The credibility of a conclusion can then be measured from the total proba-
bility calculated from the premises. Finally, a comparison between argument or a
quantitative judgment is obtained by considering the supported argument proba-
bilities.
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Argumentation-based Communication
In a MAS, argumentation has a central role that allows agents to argue, justify
positions and try to persuade another agent to endorse some statement. All these
features are quite common in a real-world society, and enable complex global be-
haviours. Argumentation can be used to model the communication among agents
in a MAS, in particular to model the dialog between two entities. A set of six
primary dialogue types is identified by [44]: persuasion, inquiry, negotiation, in-
formation seeking, deliberation and eristic. All these dialogues can be captured in
an argumentation framework [29], and they are developed strictly among two enti-
ties. In [9] an implementation of information-seeking dialog based on tuple centre
architecture is presented. However, a definition for a dialogue says that a dialogue
is a mutual conversation between two or more people. In a society there are forms
of communication among multiple entities that enable humans to work together
and achieve their goals. Following that definition, we can naturally extend the
dialogue concept in MAS from two agents to N agents. The argumentation-based
dialogues listed above, for instance, could be transformed in social discussions
among agents.
2.2 Argumentation System
There are many existing formalisms to present argumentation theory such as de-
fensible logic, default logic and auto-epistemic logic as special case. In our vision,
an argument is a minimal set of facts that conduce to a conclusion. We use an un-
derlining monotonic logic, with logical connective representing implication and
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with a semantics and proof theory already provided with logic, to represent and
define arguments.
Prakken and Vreeswijk [36], in their study of logics for defensible argumenta-
tion, observe that an argumentation system is generally composed of five elements
(although sometimes implicitly): 1) a logical language; 2) an argument definition;
3) a concept of conflict among arguments; 4) a concept of defeated argument;
5) a concept of argument acceptability. In this section we define an argumenta-
tion system as a reference point for our work. We take inspiration from Dung’s
framework [10], and we also define the structure inside the arguments.
The underlining logic of our system is a first-order language, where Σ contains
all well-formed formulae. The symbol ` denotes classical inference (different
styles will be used like deduction, induction and abduction), ≡ denotes logical
equivalence, and ¬ or non is used for logical negation.
2.2.1 Formal Model
Typically an argument has an internal structure, comprising of inferences that
leads to a conclusion. It has three components: beliefs, inference rules and con-
clusions.
• beliefs are facts and rules that represent premises
• inference rules are labels that represent inference processes such as deduc-
tion or induction
• conclusions are facts that represent results of the inference process applied
to the beliefs
9
In our system, we express the argument in predicate logic using the logic tuple
notation. We take inspiration from Dung’s framework [10], and we also define
the structure inside the arguments. In [36] an argumentation system formalized in
propositional logic is presented. Whereas we follow such an approach, we also try
to extend it using predicative logic, which suits a logic programming framework.
The object language of our system is a first-order language, where Σ contains
all well-formed formulae. The symbol ` denotes classical inference (different
styles will be used like deduction, induction and abduction) ≡ denotes logical
equivalence, and ¬ or non is used for logical negation.
Definition 1 An argument is a triple A = 〈B, I,C〉 where B = {p1, . . . , pn} ⊆ Σ
is a set of beliefs, `I∈ {`d,`i,`a} is the inference style (respectively, deducion,
induction, or abduction), and C = {c1, . . . ,cn} ⊆ Σ is a set of conclusions, such
that:
1. B is consistent
2. B `I C
3. B is minimal, so no subset of B satisfying both 1 and 2 exists
For instance, a classical example of argument like all men are mortal, Socrates is
a man, Socrates is mortal, in our representation becomes:
• B= human(Socrates),human(X)→ mortal(X)
• I = `MP Modus Ponens
• C 3 mortal(Socrates)
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Our formalization of the ‘Socrates argument’ can be easily mapped in a logic
tuple. In the process of mapping, we add the predicate argument with the function
name and other predicates such as beliefs, infer and conclusions to represent the
triple A= 〈B, I,C〉.
argument(name,beliefs([human(Socrates)], [clause(mortal(X), [human(X)])]),
infer(MP),conclusions([mortal(Socrates)])).
A declarative representation of arguments could be useful to store and collect the
arguments during the argumentation process. The formula argument in our system
is the basic unit to represent an argument.
The inference rules we consider for deduction areModus Ponens ( MP), Multi-
Modus Ponens ( MPP) and Modus Tollens ( MT).
B B→C
C
(MP)
B1 B2 B3 (B1∧B2∧B3)→C
C
(MPP)
The MP is a particular case of MMP with only one premise. Socrates argument is
a example of MP deductive argument. Also, MT formula expresses a deductive
inference.
¬A B→ A
¬B (MT)
For example, all humans are mortal, but Eraclito is not mortal, than Eraclito is not
human, in tuple form is:
argument(name,beliefs([non(mortal(eraclito))], [clause(mortal(X),
[human(X)])]), infer(MT),conclusions([non(human(eraclito))])).
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The inference rule that we use for induction is θ -subsumption, as shown in ( θ -su).
B
R
where Rθ ⊆ B (θ -su)
For example,mortal(X)← human(X), θ -subsumesmortal(socrates)← human(socrates)
with θ = 〈X = socrates〉, in tuple form looks like
argument(name,beliefs([mortal(socrates),human(socrates)]),
infer(Su),conclusions([clause(mortal(X), [human(X))])])).
This process derives a general rule R from specific beliefs B, but is not a legal
inference in a strict sense. Currently, we do not consider it as a probability value
that could be associated to the result of an induction process. Finally, the abductive
reasoning is expressed with the inference rule shown in ( Ab).
B A→ B
A
(Ab)
For example, all humans are mortal, Parmenide is a mortal, then Parmenide is a
human, in tuple form looks like
argument(name,beliefs([mortal(parmenide)], [clause(mortal(X),
[human(X)])]), infer(Ab),conclusions([human(parmenide)]).
The definition of contrast is not trivial, because there are different types of attack
well defined in [36]. Following those definitions, two possible types of attack are
‘conclusions against conclusions’ – called rebuttals – and ‘conclusions against
beliefs’—called undercuts.
Definition 2 Let A1 = 〈B1, I1,C1〉 and A2 = 〈B2, I2,C2〉 are two distinct argu-
ments, A1 is an undercut for A2 iff ∃h ∈C1 such that h≡ ¬bi where bi ∈ B2
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Definition 3 Let A1 = 〈B1, I1,C1〉 and A2 = 〈B2, I2,C2〉 are two distinct argu-
ments, A1 is a rebuttal for A2 iff ∃h ∈C1 such that h≡ ¬ci where ci ∈C2
From the algorithmic point of view, it is necessary to identify the opposite predi-
cate: α defeats ¬α in order to find the contrast argument. In our framework we in-
troduce non/1 operator that identifies the opposite predicate: non(mortal(Socrates))
is opposite to mortal(Socrates). We also introduce another notion of undercut
based on the principle of refutation. To find an attack to the rule, a counterex-
ample is required that disproves its truth. An argument A1 is attacked through a
counterexample contained in the conclusion of another argument. In formula, we
consider an implication with only one premise A→ B ≡ ¬A∨B the contrary is:
A¬(¬A∨B) ≡ A∧¬B. An expression with A and the negation of B is a coun-
terexample of the implication. For instance, the following argument undercuts the
Socrates example by refuting the implication mortal(X)→ human(X):
argument(name,beliefs([human(Eraclito),non(mortal(Eraclito))]),
infer(T ),conclusions([human(Eraclito),non(mortal(Eraclito))])).
This type of attack is possible only with an explicit representation of the rules.
Finally inside the component there are the main algorithms to manipulate the
conflict knowledge in order to decide the admissible subset of a set of arguments
and to determine whether a new argument is acceptable or not. The definitions of
acceptability and admissibility used in our framework are in agreement with [10].
The following definitions are the basic ones in our argumentation system and take
inspiration from Dung’s framework.
Definition 4 An argument set S is a conflict free set iff there exists no Ai,A j ∈ S
such that Ai attacks A j.
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Definition 5 An argument set S defends collectively all its elements if ∀ argument
B /∈ S where B attacks A ∈ S ∃ C ∈ S : C attacks B.
Definition 6 An argument set S is a admissible set iff S is conflict free and S
defends collectively all its elements.
Definition 7 An argument set S is a preferred extension iff S is a maximal set
among the admissible set of A.
We consider also important argument extensions such as acceptability in order to
determine whether a new argument is acceptable or not. In the context of preferred
semantics the acceptance problem is divided in credulous acceptance or sceptical
acceptance, if an argument is in some/all preferred extension.
Definition 8 An argument A is credulous acceptable if A ∈ at least one preferred
extension.
Definition 9 An argument A is sceptical acceptable if A ∈ all preferred exten-
sions.
2.3 Dialog System
In this section we present a novel formalization of a multi-agent dialog system.
Our intention is to capture the rules which govern legal utterances, and which
govern the effects of utterances on the commitment stores of the dialog. We use
a process algebra approach in the style of [41] to represent the possible paths
which a dialog may take, and to represent explicitly the operations to and from the
commitment stores. We proceed by considering each element of a dialog system
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in turn: 1) the communication language; 2) the interaction protocol; and 3) the
protocol semantics.
Because a dialog is a dialectical exchange of arguments, we assume that ar-
guments and counter-arguments are represented and expressed in the formal lan-
guage defined above in Section 2.2. Agents may exchange arguments, along with
facts, with one another in the form of instantiated parameters in their utterances.
2.3.1 Communication Language
The agents need to share a same communication languageCL in order to exchange
information. The role ofCL as a language used for internal knowledge representa-
tion and reasoning is explained in [29]. We let F denote a set of terms representing
facts, and A the set of terms representing all arguments able to be represented in
Σ following the definition of an argument given in Definition 1. OurCL is defined
in order to support all six primary dialogue types as identified by [44]: persuasion,
inquiry, negotiation, information seeking, deliberation and eristic.
Definition 10 Our communication language is a set of locutions Lc. A locution
l ∈ Lc is a term of the form perfname(Arg1, . . . ,Argn) where perfname is a element
of the set P of performatives and Argx is either a fact or an argument.
An agent performing a dialog exploiting the communication language can utter
a locution composed of facts and arguments. A fact is represented by syntax
fact(Terms) and an argument with argument(B,I,C). The definitions to
manage attacking and undercutting arguments are provided by the underlying ar-
gumentation system given in Definition 1. In the example 1 an agent wants to
communicate the classical example of argument like All men are mortal, Socrates
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is a man, Socrates is mortal, and it uses an Argue locution with an argument
parameter.
Example 1 Argue(argument(name,beliefs([human(Socrates)],[clause(mortal(X),
[human(X)])]),infer(MP),conclusions([mortal(Socrates)]))).
Examples of performatives to support an instance of an Information Seeking Dia-
log could be: OpenDialog, Ask, Tell, DontTell, Provide, Argue, and
so on. Further details about this form of dialog and its complete locutions are
presented in [9].
2.3.2 Dialog Protocol
In our framework the dialog protocol is a complete description of all possible
dialog paths, from the perspective of an external entity observing the dialog be-
tween the agents. The protocol indicates the possible paths of a dialog, specifies
the source and target of each message and shows the relationship between utter-
ances and the content of commitment stores. Our approach basically describes the
step-by-step behaviour of an external entity acting as a mediator, hence enabling
the allowed interactions. Therefore, we technically find it useful to model a dia-
log in terms of a process algebra with standard composition operators (sequence,
parallel, iteration), and whose atomic actions represent either agent utterances or
interactions with the commitment store (writing, reading or removing a commit-
ment).
On the one hand, Prakken [33] proposes a general definition of locution where
a move m is denoted by four elements: 1) identifier, 2) speaker (or source), 3)
speech act and 4) intended recipient (or target). Following this model, we provide
a definition of a speech act, as follows:
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Definition 11 An action A is defined by the syntax A ::= s : Lc|s[t1, . . . , tn] : Lc
where s indicates the source, and [t1, . . . , tn] indicates the (optional) targets of the
message.
On the other, beyond this, we include additional atomic operations K over com-
mitment stores—many of them can actually occur into one argumentation artifact.
To this end, the commitment store is viewed as a set of tuples as in [20]: such tu-
ples are manipulated by the commands of the Linda language [13]—in, rd and
out.
Definition 12 A term action K has the syntax K ::= in(C,X)|out(C,X)|rd(C,X),
where C is a term representing the commitment store identifier, and X is a term
representing the commitment.
Specifically, the commands in(C,t), rd(C,t) and out(C,t) respectively
consume, read and put a tuple t in the commitment store C. These actions are
useful to manage the private or public commitment store in relation to the dialog
execution. In particular, they can operate, for example, as action-preconditions in
order to restrict or constrain the next action choice, and thus enable only cer-
tain future dialog paths. If at a given time a sub-dialog is guarded by oper-
ation rd(c,commit(a)), for instance, then it is allowed to proceed only if
commit(a) occurs in the commitment store.
Definition 13 A protocol P is a composition of action from sets A and K, de-
fined by syntax P ::= 0 |A |K |P.P |P+P |PB P |(P ‖ P) | !P where the symbols
.,+,B,‖, ! denote respectively sequencencial composition, choice, left-priority-
choice, parallel composition, and infinite replication operators.
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For example, an abstract dialog protocol definition is given by D := (s : a1+ s :
a2).(s : a3+ s : a4);s : a5 where agent s is only allowed to execute a sequence of
three actions: the sequence composed of a first action consisting of either action
a1 or action a2, then a second action consisting of either a3 or a4, and then a
third action comprising a5. A protocol specifies a set of actions histories, that
the agents might execute. As another example of a protocol definition, consider
D := s : a1 ‖ s : a1 ‖ s : a1 ‖ t : a2 ‖ t : a3 where agent s can invoke a1 at most three
times, agent t can invoke a2 and a3 only once, but in whichever order.
To illustrate this framework, we present a specification for an Information-
Seeking dialog ( f is seen as a variable over the content of communication):
Example 2 (Information Seeking Dialog) c:OpenDialog.
s:OpenDialog.
!(c:Ask(f).
s:Tell(f).(
rd(perm(c,f)).
s:Provide(f).
s:Argue(perm(c,f),YES,A)
+
s:DontTell(f).
s:Argue(perm(c,f),NO,B).
c:Argue(perm(c,$\phi$),ADD,A). (
s:Argue(perm(c,f),NO,B)
+
s:Accept(A,perm(c,f)).
18
in(Accept(perm(c,f)))
) ) )
2.4 Operational Semantics
Following Hamblin [17], we assume that each agent is associated with a knowl-
edge base, accessible to all agents, containing its commitments made in the course
of the dialogue. Commitments are understood as statements which the associated
agent must support, while they remain in the commitment store, if these state-
ments are questioned or attacked by other agents. We can now use the notion of
commitment store and the transition system given in Definition 15 to define an
operational semantics for the dialog system. This semantics describes the evo-
lution over time of the dialog state and the states of commitment store (seen as
composition of all commitment stores). In essence, the commitment store is the
knowledge repository of the dialog as a whole, and it is expressed in our frame-
work as a multiset of terms.
Definition 14 A commitment store C is a multiset of terms and it is defined by the
syntax C ::= 0|(C|C)|X where X is a term.
Definition 15 The operational semantics of our dialog system is described by a
labelled transition system 〈S,→, I〉, where S ::= (C)P represents the state of dia-
log system (protocol P running with commitment store C), I is the set of interac-
tions (labels) composed of i ::= λ : θ where λ ::= τ|a and θ is a term substitution,
and→ is a transition relation of the kind→⊆ S× I×S.
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A term substitution θ is of the kind {x/y}: when applied to a term t by syntax
t{x/y} it means t after applying the most general substitution between terms x
and y—x should be an instance of y, otherwise the substitution notation would
not make sense. As usual, we write s i−→ s′ in place of 〈s, i,s′〉 ∈←, meaning the
dialog system moves from state s to s′ due to interaction i—either an action a
or an internal step τ (an operation over the commitment store), involving a term
substitution θ inside the protocol. We introduce a congruence relation ≡, which
syntactically equates similar states:
0.P≡ P P.0≡ P (P.Q).R≡ P.(Q.R) !P≡ P|!P
0+P≡ P P+Q≡ Q+P (P+Q)+R≡ P+(Q+R)
0BP≡ P PB0≡ P (PBQ)BR≡ PB (QBR)
0 ‖ P P ‖ Q≡ Q ‖ P (P ‖ Q) ‖ R≡ P ‖ (Q ‖ R)
Finally, we define operational rules that describe the behavior of the dialog system
as follows:
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(C)out(x) τ:θI−→ (C|x)0 (OUT )
(C|x)rd(y) τ:{x/y}−→ (C|x)0 (RD)
(C|x)in(y) τ:{x/y}−→ (C)0 (IN)
(C)a
a′{a′/a}−→ (C)0 (ACT )
(C)(P.Q) λ :θ→ (C′)P′.Qθ if (C)P λ :θ−→ (C′)P′ (SEQ)
(C)(P+Q) i→ (C′)P′ if (C)P i→ (C′)P′ (SUM)
(C)(PBQ) i→ (C′)P′ if (C)P i→ (C′)P′ (LEFT )
(C)(PBQ) i→ (C′)Q′ if (C)P9 (C)Q i→ (C′)Q′ (RIGHT )
(C)(P|Q) i→ (C′)(P′|Q) if (C)P i→ (C′)P′ (PAR)
(C)P i→ (C′)Q if P≡ P′ (C)P′ i→ (C′)Q (EQUIV )
Rule (OUT) provides the local semantic of out operation, expressing that x term
is added to the commitment store C. Rules (RD) and (IN) similarly handle op-
eration rd and in: the use of substitution operator guarantees that the term x in
the commitment store is an instance of the term x to be retrieved. Rule (ACT)
expresses that locution a′ is executed that is an instance of the allowed one a,
using the proper term substitution. Rule (SEQ) handles sequential composition
and substitution: in a process P.Q, P is allowed to proceed (recursively), but, if
any substitution is involved, this is applied to Q as well. Rules (SUM) and (PAR)
provide the semantics for choice and parallel operators in the standard way. Rules
(LEFT) and (RIGHT) provide the semantics for left-priority-choice: in a process
PBQ, P proceeds if allowed to, otherwise Q proceeds. Finally, rule (EQUIV)
states that transitions can be applied modulo the congruence relation.
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2.5 Issue on Argumentation
Building a software system in some domains requires the design and implementa-
tion of many programs to solve different computational tasks. In order to define a
program, the programmer has to use both the knowledge of the domain and his/her
own knowledge coming from experience. The knowledge representation is a key
point to build flexible and autonomous software systems.
In the main stream approach to develop Object Oriented or Component Ori-
ented software and in the new SOA architecture do not exist an explicit abstraction
to make explicit knowledge of the domain does not exist. Through symbolic rep-
resentation of knowledge some computational tasks are being realized by applying
different forms of inference such as: deduction, abduction, induction, model gen-
erator, updating etc. This forms of computation are strategic to develop intelligent
and complicated software systems.
In order to make all these ideas real it is necessary to provide: 1) first order
entity in the project of software system to represent knowledge, 2) a reference
logic theoryand 3) an infrastructure to make explicit symbolic knowledge repre-
sentations.
Argumentation provides a form of non-monotonic knowledge representation,
which is a generalization of non-monotonic logics. It could be a good choice
to make explicit knowledge and conflicting knowledge, to much time hidden in
software system. Also, a very useful innovation is to define a meta-model for
software system where the knowledge is a first class entity of design.
The argumentation theory could cover some lacks in software systems making
explicit conflicting knowledge and enabling form of reasoning under uncertain
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such as practical reasoning [30] and common sense reasoning [12]. Moreover,
argumentation is used in the construction of systems for legal reasoning, collec-
tive decision making and negotiation and, in general, it has a fundamental role in
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) systems.
In Multi-Agent Systems too the agents use arguments in order to exchange
information, to resolve dispute and to inform each other of some pertinent facts.
A MAS designer can provide an argumentation support within a social agent-
based context to enable a consistent evolution of social knowledge. It can also
provide agents with an instrument to enhance their ability to deal with their own
partial and incomplete knowledge.
The open issue in argumentation theory is the research of an efficient com-
putational model and scalable architecture to develop particular applications in
domains like law and medicine, where formal logic and classical decision the-
ory are unable to capture the richness of reasoning. Rahwan et al in [37] open a
new perspective on the argumentation system laying the basis for a World Wide
Argument Web. In their paper they show that semantic web, arguments and argu-
mentation ontology are strictly connected, demonstrating how an ontology repre-
sentation of arguments enables the description of web contents through a network
of arguments on the Semantic Web. An interesting example of this use is pro-
vided by Discourse DB1 forum powered by Semantic MediaWiki 2. Nowadays,
the open issue is building an infrastructure for large-scale argument representa-
tion, manipulation and evaluation, that could become pervasive in the Word Wide
Web context.
1See http://discoursedb.org
2See http://ontoworld.org/wiki/Semantic_MediaWiki
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Chapter 3
Argumentation and Artifact
In this chapter we propose desidered functionalities of artifacts for exploiting ar-
guments. In building multi-agent systems the most hopeful meta-model is A&A
that proposes agents and artifacts as first class abstraction to model the system.
Two types of artifacts based on argumentation are proposed: Co-Argumentation
Artifact for construction of common knowledge and Dialog Artifact to enable me-
diate argument-based communication.
3.1 A&A meta-model for MAS
Agent-based systems technology is the new paradigm for conceptualizing, de-
signing, and implementing software systems. A Multi Agent System is a system
composed of several software agents, collectively capable of reaching goals that
monolithic systems find difficult to achieve. A most promising approach to design
MAS is the A&Ameta-model that re-interprets MAS in terms of two fundamental
abstractions: agents and artifacts.
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Agents are the active entities encapsulating control, which are in charge of
the goals/tasks all together building up the whole MAS behaviour. Artifacts are
instead the passive, reactive entities in charge of the services and functions that
make individual agents work together in a MAS, and that shape agent environ-
ment according to the MAS needs. An artifact is used by agents, possibly featur-
ing useful properties such as controllability, malleability, linkability, and situation
[26]. More generally, to engineering software systems: (1) agents represent task-
oriented or goal-oriented components that act pro-actively according to their task
or goal; (2) artifacts represent resources or tools that are used by agents during
their activities.
The design of agent-based artificial societies is based on the notion of artifact
[27], which takes inspiration from Activity Theory [21], where any human activ-
ity within a society is enabled, constrained or mediated by artifacts. An artifact is
social construct shared by agents of a MAS and is necessary to mediate interaction
among agents and between agents and their environment. Unlike agents, artifacts
are not meant to be autonomous or exhibit a proactive behaviour. Among the
main properties of an artifact there are: (i) inspectability and controllability, i.e.
the capability of observing and controlling artifact structure, state and behaviour
at runtime and of supporting their on-line management, in terms of diagnosing,
debugging, testing; (ii) malleability, i.e. the capability of artifact function to be
changed / adapted at runtime (on-the-fly) according to new requirements or un-
predictable events occurring in the open environment, (iii) linkability, i.e. the
capability of linking together at runtime distinct artifacts as a form of composi-
tion, as a means to scale up with complexity of the function to provide, and also
to support dynamic reuse, (iv) situation, i.e. the property of being immersed in the
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MAS environment and be reactive to environment events and changes. A traffic
light, for instance, is a sort of coordination artifact: drivers watching the signal
know what they have to do to avoid accidents at an intersection, without any need
for direct communication with one another.
In a social context, people have only partial knowledge about the world and
use arguments in order to solve problems, to reduce conflicts or to exchange in-
formation. The same holds for intelligent agents in a multi agent system; here,
however, it is not clear what could act as a support for argumentation between
agents, external to the agents themselves. To this end, this work exploits the
agents and artifacts (A&A) meta-model for MAS, exploring the use of artifacts
for agent argumentation within a MAS.
3.2 Mediated Interaction
Mediation is useful to achieve cooperation between the entities and the coordi-
nation of the global system. In a MAS, in particular, mediation among agents
has a central role to coordinate activities, to achieve social goals, and to sup-
port interaction. Moreover, in a system there are social properties that need to be
expressed outside agents. Knowledge too, also according to Distributed Cogni-
tion [18], is not bounded inside each individual agent, but is instead distributed
among agents and artifacts in the environment. Environment-based coordination
and, more generally, mediated interaction frameworks and infrastructures based
on forms of coordination / cooperation without direct communication are among
the most promising lines of research in the MAS field.
In a human society the role of mediator exists: in a Dispute Resolution for
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instance, the mediator ensures fairness and a correct resolution of the dispute.
Proponents of public policy conversations and decision-making processes usually
emphasize the need for a human moderator or mediator to be involved in the in-
teraction, e.g., [11]. The mediator may act to ensure equality of access by all par-
ticipants, assist participants to clarify their positions and to argue more effectively
and even try to reconcile opposing views. Similarly, the designers of computer-
aided argumentation systems have also provided support for human mediators; the
developers of Zeno, for example, define their system as “a mediation system” [14,
p.10]:
“a kind of computer-based discussion forum with particular sup-
port for argumentation. In addition to the generic functions for view-
ing, browsing and responding to messages, a mediation system uses a
formal model of argumentation to facilitate retrieval, to show and
manage dependencies between arguments, to provide heuristic in-
formation focusing the discussion on solutions which appear most
promising, and to assist human mediators in providing advice about
the rights and obligations of the participants in formally regulated
decision making procedures.”
Just as with human interactions, and for the same reasons, many of the functions
provided by mediators could be useful when software agents engage in argumen-
tation with one another. The mediator is useful to coordinate agents that have to
achieve a global goal. Some of these mediator functions require only limited intel-
ligence that could, for example, support the storage and share arguments with the
participants. These functionality could be automatically provided by an artifact.
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3.3 Multi-agent Argumentation System
Our model of a multi-agent argumentation system following A&A meta-model
exploits two types of entities: agents and artifacts. In particular in our model
we consider intelligent dialog agents and two types of artifacts: a dialog artifact
and a co-argumentation artifact. Co-Argumentation Artifact (CAA) is a central co-
ordinating entity in an argumentation dialog, that provides co-ordination services
to the participating agents allowing them to share, store and exchange arguments
with one another. Vesting the CAA with its own argumentation capabilities means
that this entity, like the participants, could undertake reasoning across the argu-
ments it stores. The CAA, for example, could determine whether a particular
argument is acceptable (under a specific semantics of argumentation) with respect
to the global knowledge of all the participants.
It is easy to imagine that the CAA could undertake more sophisticated inter-
ventions in the dialog resembling complex, automated tasks of a human mediator.
To this end, we extend our earlier concept of a central co-ordinating artifact to
be a dialog artifact (DA), acting as a mediator between the participating agents.
Dialog participants, of course, need to be able to generate, evaluate, contest and
defend arguments as they interact with one another through dialog. But the dialog
artifact also needs this argumentation functionality if it is to find common ground
between different participants, or to clarify their differences. For example, if the
dialog artifact is to convince two participants that their opposed positions in fact
share common assumptions or that one position implies the other, then the media-
tor artifact may need – in an automated way – to create, present and defend a case
to the participants.
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Consequently, we have described two conceptual artifacts variously required
by the entities in our system. The combination of both artifacts provides the sup-
port of basic and advanced functionality for automatic mediation services in a
MAS. Some basic functionalities to support the exchange of arguments in a dia-
log between the participants include:
1. Storage of the dialog protocol (e.g. in a library of such protocols)
2. Storage of the specifications of the dialog protocol
3. Storage of the complete history of a dialog as it proceeds
4. The ability to refuse to allow agent utterances which do conform to the
current protocol in use
5. The ability to suggest next moves which are legal according to the current
protocol in use in a dialog
6. The ability to receive and store confidential information from the participat-
ing agents, such as their preferences in a negotiation. The mediator could
then aggregate such information (across multiple agents), and/or seek to
identify and reconcile differences.
Also, the central artifact could act as a sophisticated mediator of the discussion,
by providing in an automated way the following services:
1. Seeking to resolve any dispute over the rules of the protocol
2. Providing rewards or penalties to agents for breaking the protocol rules
3. Having the power to admit or to expel agents to/from the dialog
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4. Suggesting a new protocol, when needed.
5. Supporting multiple simultaneous bilateral interactions.
6. Assigning roles, rights and responsibilities to agents at run-time, as, for
example, in an action protocol, assigning the role of winner to a particular
agent near the end of the interaction.
7. Identifying conflicts and inconsistencies between commitments made by
agents in a dialog, for example, if an agent commits to sell a car it is also
trying to purchase.
8. Identifying agent utterances which are not relevant to the current state of the
dialog, and refusing to permit these to be made.
9. Providing automated alerts to inform agents that dialogs on particular topics
are about to start, or to end, or that particular commitments have just been
made.
10. Combining different dialogs on the same topic.
More advanced functions of the CAA and DA combination could also include:
1. Annotation of protocols with their properties, for protocols stored in the
protocol library, for instance, the possible outcomes of a protocol, its com-
putational complexity, and so on.
2. Storing the outcomes of past dialogs, like for example the commitments
remaining at the end of the dialog.
3. Tracking agent commitments across multiple dialogs.
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4. Using previous dialogs to create an independent assessment of the reputa-
tion of participating agents.
5. Storage of the entire history of past dialogs. These may be required for
regulatory or legal reasons, e.g. in stock market transactions.
In section 3.5 and 3.4, we present a formalization respectively of the DA and
CAA which conceptually supports the basic functionalities listed above.
Figure 3.1: General Architecture of Multi-agent argumentation system
Figure 3.1 presents a possible architecture for a Multi-agent argumentation
system. We propose a scalable architecture composed of a local CAA private for
an agent and a global CAA common for the agent society. An agent exploits own
local CAA to coordinate its mental state. Classically those functions (to store,
to manage and to retrieve arguments) are provided by an internal argumentation
component hidden inside the agent. Exploiting A&A vision we propose to make
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an explicit representation of agent mental state by a co-argumentation artifact.
Global CAA and DA artifacts provide services and functionalities listed above
for the entire agent society. Ideally, in the model DA and CAA are separate enti-
ties with separate and orthogonal functionalities. In an implementation scenario
both common artifacts could collapse in one unique global entity without loss of
generality.
To validate the architecture, we focus our attention on dispute resolution sys-
tem in artificial society, where the dialog has a fundamental role in achieving a
solution. In particular, the persuasion dialog based on arguments is exploited by
agents to find an agreement.A dispute resolution is not an easy task and usually in-
volves more entities (including mediator or arbitrator). Our architecture provides
the desired abstraction and properties to realize a mediation service for dispute
resolution in an agent society.
3.4 Co-Argumentation Artifact
In this section, combining multi-agent argumentation with the A&A meta-model
we define a Co-Argumentation Artifact (CAA) as an artifact specialized in man-
aging arguments and providing coordination services for argumentation process
in a MAS. The CAA is a mediator of agent interaction and supports a simplified
implementation of multi-agent argumentation system. It provides functionality
that allows agents to exploit social commitment, enabling them to share, store and
exchange arguments.
A simple example of social use of CAA is to fix social acceptance of the
arguments: the goal is determining whether an argument is acceptable with respect
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to the global knowledge of the community. The CAA applies an argumentation
semantics over the shared arguments, which provides for the acceptance criteria.
Another interesting example is the use of CAA as a commitment store during the
dialog process. Tracing the commitments is fundamental for the next step of the
discussion. Also, from the arguments stored during the dialog process the CAA
could deduce or induce new knowledge. The introduction of the CAA model
provides new support to design communications that involve more entities in a
social context.
A similar type of artifact is the co-ordination artifact [27], specialised in pro-
viding a coordination service in MAS [40]. A typical use of a co-ordination arti-
fact is enabling the exchange of information among agents in an open and dynamic
environment—like a mailbox or a blackboard. Another interesting example is the
use of the co-ordination artifact for knowledge mediation where the information
can be manipulated by the artifact through either aggregation or induction process.
We define a CAA as a coupleCAA= 〈S,AC〉 where S is the store of arguments
and AC argumentation component is the collection of specifications to work over
set of arguments.
Store
The class S is a collection of concrete representations of arguments, beliefs and
argument sets. The store enables the agents and artifacts to write, read, search
and consume information in form of arguments. Sharing arguments permits the
CAA to calculate argument sets over a common knowledge and for instance fix
a global argument acceptability - following acceptance argument definition pro-
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vided in 2.2. Moreover, the stores could represent public or private information
from agents or artifacts, the access of which is regulated by particular policies.
Argumentation Component
The argumentation component is a set of specifications that should be useful in
principle in order to control a set of conflicting arguments. The main functions
of this class are to calculate the preferred extensions of a set of arguments and to
determine whether a new argument is valid and acceptable. Also, our goals are
the utilization of these algorithms by each of the agents of an agent society and
by artifacts embodying the social argumentation processes. This would be useful,
for example, to identify subsets of arguments agreeable to all participants in a
MAS. We adopt the argumentation system presented in the previous section with
a tuple-based notation and the Prolog logic language to implement the algorithms.
Prolog is very useful because of the uniform representation of code and data, both
represented as first-order logic clauses, which makes writing (meta-)interpreters
quite easy [39]. Our current specification of the AC follows the preferred semantic
and it provides service to calculate: 1) conflict free sets, 2) preferred extensions
and 3) admissible sets. In order to compute all these features, AC is composed of
several modules and each module provides a specific set of constrains resulting
from the analysis of the input argument set.
Argument base module contains all argument of the domain represented by S
Argumentation consistency check module verifies monotonicity of argument com-
position
Contrary module finds predicates that are in contrast
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Argument set module makes argument division in sets be based on a given se-
mantic
Prolog meta-interpreter works over argument set
3.5 Dialog Artifact
As mentioned above, the A&A meta-model for MAS as discussed in [22] views
agents engaged in argumentative communication as making use of an abstraction,
called a Co-Argumentation Artifact, to communicate, to exchange information,
data and arguments, and to record their public commitments. The current work
extends this abstraction by formally defining a Dialog Artifact (DA), able to sup-
port and mediate the communication between agents engaged in a dialog under
the system defined in Section 2.3 above.
We define the Dialog Artifact as a triple DA = 〈DP,CS, IC〉, where: DP is a
collection of specifications of dialog protocols;CS is a collection of commitments
stores; and IC is a collection of specifications of interaction control (IC). We now
define each of these components in turn.
Dialog Protocols
The classDP is a collection of formal specifications of dialog protocols, with each
protocol specified using a labeled process algebra, as in Definition 13. Protocols
in DP may also be annotated with identifiers and with their properties, such as
their termination complexity. When agents engage in dialog using a protocol in
the collection DP, they make utterances according to the permitted sequences
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defined by the protocol specification. Accordingly, the Dialog Artifact is able to
verify that utterances proposed by agents in a dialog are valid under the protocol;
the DA is also able to use the specification to suggest potential legal utterances to
participating agents at each point of the dialog.
Commitment Stores
For any particular collection of agents and any particular dialog they undertake,
the collectionCS specifies a set of stores representing the private and public Com-
mitment Stores of each participant, together with a central Commitment Store for
the dialog as a whole. The Dialog Artifact can support the dialog by holding these
stores. The private Commitment Stores are also held by the DA to record confi-
dential information entrusted to it by the participants, such as their private valu-
ations of some scarce resource (in the case of Negotiation dialogs) or arguments
based on privileged information (in the case of dialogues over beliefs). Sharing
such information with the DA may allow the DA to reason across these stores in
a manner which does not reveal the private information of individual agents.
We can classify these various types of stores according to the access permis-
sions (write-, read-, and delete-permissions) holding on each store, as shown in
Table 3.1. The cells of this table indicate the access permissions pertaining to dif-
ferent types of Commitment Stores (the rows of the table), depending on the agent
seeking access (the columns of the table). The Dialog Artifact may also store other
relevant information, such as the sequence of locutions exchanged in the current
dialog, which would be stored in the Central Commitment Store. These stores
do not have an algebraic structure but a declarative representation of the contents
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Type Agent A All Agents Mediator Artifact
Private Commitment Store of Agent A R/W/D - R
Public Commitment Store of Agent A R/W/D R R
Central Commitment Store - R R/W/D
Table 3.1: Commitment Stores - Read (R), write (W) and delete (D) Permissions
with a proper classification.
Interaction Control
The third component of the Dialog Artifact, denoted as IC, is a collection of spec-
ifications for interaction control. We roughly follow the pattern MVC (Model
View Control), where the model is the dialog specification in DP, the view is the
CS component with dialog trace and the control is represented by IC specifica-
tion. The control rule of the dialog is represented by the label transition system
introduced in previous section, modelling the evolution over time of the agent
interaction protocol. Three operators can be used to control the dialog:
nextI(s) =
{
i : s i→ s′
}
nextS(s) =
{
s′ : ∃i,s i→ s′
}
nextIS =
{
(i,s′) : s i→ s′
}
Operator nextI(s) yields the next admissible interactions i from state s. Operator
nextS(s) yields the states reachable from s in one step. Operator nextIS yields
couples (i,s) instead.
The component IC realizes the above three operators in order to identify which
potential utterances for any agent at any point in the dialog are legal. The basic
primitives in,rd,out to manage arguments and facts in commitment stores al-
low the IC to identify which constraints on the future course of dialogs are created
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by the existing commitments. For instance, the IC could permit only one utterance
in a chosen point basing the decision on state of commitment store. Also, it can
work with argument set over some advanced structures such as conflict free sets
and preferred extensions presented in section 2.2 to determine, for instance, an
argument acceptability.
DA & CAA Functionalities
It is straightforward to see that all six basic functionalities of a multi-agent ar-
gumentation system listed in Section 3.3 can be performed by a Dialog Artifact
defined as a tripleDA= 〈DP,CS,LI〉 and Co-Argumentation ArtifactCA= 〈S,AC〉
as above. Basically the CAA is exploited by DA such as its Central Commitment
Store. The collection DP provides the functionalities of items 1 and 2, the storage
of protocols and their formal specifications; the Central Commitment Store of the
collection CS, which could be realized by CAA, provides storage for the history
of a dialog, item 3; similarly, the private Commitment Store components of the
collectionCS realized byCAA provides storage for confidential information com-
municated from agents to global DA & CAA, item 6; the formal specification of
a protocol in DP (as given by the process algebra formalism we have used above)
permits the DA to identify potential utterances which do not conform to the pro-
tocol, item 4; and both the formal protocol specifications in the collection DP and
the logics of interaction in IC permit the DA to suggest possible legal next moves,
item 5.
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Chapter 4
Implementation of Dialog and
Argumentation Artifact
Logic programming and meta logic programming are two useful techniques to
prototype quickly complicated software systems with rational behavior.TuCSoN
infrastructure following a Linda like coordination model provides a programmable
environment based on logic tuples. In this chapter TuCSoN infrastructure and
logic programming techniques are exploited in order to realize the artifacts.
4.1 The TuCSoN Infrastructure
The technological support to build artifacts is provided here by TuCSoN, a co-
ordination infrastructure for MAS introduced in [28]. TuCSoN provides MAS
with coordination abstractions called tuple centres where agents write, read and
consume logic tuples via simple communication operations (out, rd, in, inp,
rdp). As programmable tuple spaces [24], tuple centers can play the role of au-
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tomatic agent mediators, where coordination rules are expressed in terms of logic
specification tuples of theReSpecT language—an event driven language over the
multi-set of tuples [23].
Tuple centres can play the role of agent coordinators, where coordination rules
are expressed in terms of tuples, and also be considered such as a general sup-
port for artefacts. As a coordination artifact, a tuple centre is also a container of
knowledge declaratively represented through logic tuples, and is equipped with
Turing-equivalent computational power through the ReSpecT specification lan-
guage. There, MAS coordination is obtained by governing the exchange of logic
tuples through the tuple centres by properly programming their reactive behaviour.
4.2 CAA Implementation
So, in order to realize a CAA, an obvious choice is to exploit a TuCSoN logic
tuple centre. In fact, on the one hand a typical argumentation process is com-
posed of two parts: (1) knowledge representation; and (2) computation over the
set of arguments. On the other hand, the tuple centre architecture is also com-
posed of two parts: an ordinary tuple space where the information are stored in
form of tuples, and a behaviour specification that defines the computation over the
tuple set. Thus, a TuCSoN tuple centre could support the argumentation process
by representing knowledge declaratively in terms of logic-tuple arguments, and
by specifying the computation over argument set in term of ReSpecT specifica-
tion tuples. Therefore, our first experimental implementation of a CAA is built
as a TuCSoN tuple centre programmed with an argumentation component algo-
rithm (Section 3.4) and with arguments represented by logic tuples (Section 2.2).
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Agents use the CAA and whenever a new argument is added to the tuple centre as
a logic tuple the CAA reacts and re-calculates the conflict free sets, the admissible
sets and the preferred extensions, representing them too in terms of logic tuples in
the tuple centre. A complete implementation of ReSpecT reactions joined with
the argumentation component implementation is provided in appendix A.3.
Argumentation Component Implementation
From a practical point of view, computational model is based on predicative logic
and logic programming. Each argument has its own context, where the argument
is true. The context is provided in the argument and is composed only by the set
of beliefs – facts and rules – directly declared in the tuple. The connection be-
tween the premises and the conclusion is expressed in terms of the corresponding
inference process, which is specified in the argument too.
The programs to manage, verify and compare arguments are meta-interpreters
written in Prolog. We have created a library composed of interpreters for each
type of inference rules supported: MP, MT, Su and Ab. When the component has
to evaluate an argument, the program looks for the correct interpreter and checks
if the conclusion is a consequence of the premises.
Meta-Interpreter for Argument Check
The following interpreter for argument check (1) has the argument name as its
input parameter, (2) asserts all of its facts and rules and (3) verifies its correctness
in the different sorts of inference.
check_argument(Name):-
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argument(Name,_,beliefs(facts(F),rules(R)),infer(I),conclusion(C)),
assert_list(F),
assert_list(R),
check_conclusion(I,C).
check_conclusion(mt,[T|C]):-proveMT(T).
check_conclusion(mp,[T|C]):-proveMP(T).
contrary(non(P),P):-!.
contrary(P,non(P)).
The contrary term is a support to find opposite predicate. We also add spe-
cific relation of opposition like old vs. young that in predicate form looks like
contrary(old(X),young(X)) and vice versa; or add the definition of con-
trary for the subset like a number.
% Meta-interpreter for Modus-Ponens
proveMP([]):-!.
proveMP([Goal1|Goal2]):-
!,
proveMP(Goal1),
proveMP(Goal2).
proveMP(Goal):-
write(’call:’),write(Goal),nl,
(my_clause(Goal,Body);call(Goal)),!,
proveMP(Body).
% Meta-interpreter for Modus-Tollens
proveMT([]):-!.
proveMT([Goal1|Goal2]):-
!,
proveMT(Goal1),
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proveMT(Goal2).
proveMT(Goal):-
write(’call:’),write(Goal),nl,
contrary(Goal,NegGoal),
my_clause(Head ,[NegGoal|T]),contrary(Head,NegHead),NegHead.
Example 3 Check of argument in Modus Ponens and execution trace
argument(arg1,1,beliefs(facts([man(john),age(90,john)]),
rules([my_clause(old(X),[human(X),age(A,X),A>80]),
my_clause(human(X),[man(X)])])),
infer(mp),conclusion([old(john)])).
?- check_argument(arg1).
assert:man(john)
assert:age(90, john)
assert:my_clause(old(_G385), [human(_G385), age(_G395, _G385), _G395>80])
assert:my_clause(human(_G385), [man(_G385)])
prove:old(john)
call:old(john)
call:human(john)
call:man(john)
call:age(_G430, john)
call:90>80
Yes
Example 4 Check of argument in Modus Tollens
argument(arg3,1,beliefs(facts([non(mortal(eraclito))]),
rules([my_clause(mortal(X),[human(X)])])),
infer(mt),
conclusion([non(human(eraclito))])).
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?- check_argument(arg3).
Yes
Meta-Interpreter for Argument Management
Managing the argument set requires in particular an ability to calculate: (1) the
relations of undercut and attack between arguments; (2) the conflict-free sets; and
(3) the preferred extensions. Undercut and attack relations are found by com-
paring the ‘conclusion vs. conclusion’ and ‘conclusion vs. beliefs’ (and vice
versa) between two different arguments. The operation of comparison is done
in the argumentation component with the check/4 predicate. Each argument
has to be compared with the others to find all the relations; if we have N argu-
ments we have to do ≈ ∑Ni=0N2 comparisons. At the end of this process, tracing
the attack(from,to) and undercut(from,to)we obtain a defeat graph
where the relations are the arcs and the arguments are the nodes, according to
Dung [10].
The core of the argumentation component is represented by the interpreters
that manage the arguments in order to find the conflict free sets, the admissible
sets and the preferred extensions.
Conflict Free Set
The problem of a conflict free set is already known in graph theory with the name
of stable set or independent set. It is in the class of NP-hard problem, for which
it is very unlikely to find an efficient algorithm. Our idea is to build an algorithm
that works incrementally, trying to avoid the complexity of a growing amount of
information, because we foresee a dynamic and distributed scenario where agents
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Figure 4.1: Search trees generated for 4 arguments
share their own arguments at different times.
To solve the conflict free problem, we adopt a constraint-based approach. Our
algorithm is based on a standard backtracking strategy. The constraint is the ab-
sence of conflicts among arguments (undercut, rebuttal). A solution is consistent
if the set of arguments satisfies the constraints. In order to limit the degree of
backtracking, consistency is checked before each argument is added to the solu-
tion. When the consistency check fails, the algorithm stores partial results, and
starts backtracking. Then, it recursively tries to add all the remaining arguments.
In order to limit the size of the search space, a branching strategy is used in
the phase of set instantiation. The logic program constructs search trees with de-
creasing depth for all input elements, so that algorithm tries to find all possible
solutions around each argument. After such a search process, the selected argu-
ment is removed from the next search space. For example, if we consider a list of
four input arguments [a,b,c,d], the resulting search trees are shown in figure
4.1. There, the possible partial solutions are denoted in square brackets.
The algorithm can also be used in a dynamic context with inputs in succession.
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To find a new solution, after each update we have to insert new arguments in each
existing conflict free set, and run the algorithm again. The following Prolog code
has been tested in tuProlog 1.3.0 [1] and shows the main predicates implementing
the conflict free set division.
selection(X,[X|Rest],Rest).
selection(X,[Head|List],Rest) :-
selection(X,List,Rest).
turn(ArgumentSet):-
selection(Name,ArgumentSet,RestArgumentSet),
argument(Name,_,beliefs(facts(F),rules(R)),_,conclusion(C)),
newconflictfree(RestArgumentSet,[Name],F,C,[Name]).
newconflictfree(Arguments,Result,Facts,Conclusions,ConflictFree):-
selection(Name,Arguments,RestArguments),
argument(Name,_,beliefs(facts(F),rules(R)),_,conclusion(C)),
check(Facts,F,Conclusions,C),
append1(Facts,F,NewFacts),
append1(Conclusions,C,NewConclusions),
add2end(Name,ConflictFree,NewConflictFree),
newconflictfree(RestArguments,NewConflictFree,NewFacts,
NewConclusions,NewConflictFree).
check(FL,F,CL,C):-
not(control(FL,C)),
not(control(F,CL)),
not(control(CL,C)).
newconflictfree(_,[],_,_,_):-!,fail.
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newconflictfree(_,R,_,_,_):-
mem(P),
notsubsetset(R,P),
retract(mem(P)),
assert(mem([R|P])),!,
mem(P1),
fail.
Admissible Set and Preferred Extension
An admissible set of arguments is a conflict free set that defeats collectively all its
elements, referring back to definition 6. The notion of ‘collectively defends’ is
useful to find a subset of arguments that is more consistent than the conflict free
set. The Preferred Extension is the largest set among the admissible sets.
We have to find a conflict free set, where if an argument is attacked, then there
exists another argument in the same set that attacks the attacker. This is an indirect
form of defense, which we call collective defense.
Our algorithm to resolve the admissible set problem directly uses the conflict
free set calculated in the previous section. Also, the algorithm looks only for
undercut relations because each argument defends itself from a rebuttal attack
but not from an undercut. In a graph representation, the rebuttal relation is a
bidirectional arc; on the contrary the undercut relation is a one-direction arc.
The algorithm basically works by subtracting from each conflict free set the
arguments attacked but not defended by elements of the same set. The remaining
sets represent the solution called admissible sets. The three basic steps that the
algorithm does for each conflict free set are: (1) to find defeat arguments with
respect to the general set, (2) to find defenders from attackers in the general set,
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and (3) to remove defeat arguments without defender. Following, the Prolog code
that calculates the admissible sets, again tested in tuProlog 1.3.0.
admissible(_,[],[]).
admissible(TotalArguments,[ConflictFreeSet|Rest],Solution):-
%to find set of attacker to conflict free
findundercat(TotalArguments,ConflictFreeSet,Attacker,Defeat),
%it find the defend argument that block the attack
findundercat(ConflictFreeSet,Attacker,AttackerFromCF,DefeatOut),
removelist(DefeatOut,Attacker,AttackerNotDefeat),
findundercat(AttackerNotDefeat,Defeat,AF,DF),
removelist(DF,ConflictFreeSet,Sol),
Solution=[Sol|Result],
admissible(TotalArguments,Rest,Result).
findundercat([],_,[],[]):-!.
findundercat([H|T],CF,A,D):-
argument(H,_,beliefs(facts(F),rules(R)),infer(_),conclusion([C])),
contrary(C,P),!,
(argument(Element,_,beliefs(facts([P]),rules(_)),infer(_),conclusion(_))->
(member(Element,CF)->(A=[H|R1],D=[Element|R2]);(A=R1,D=R2));(A=R1,D=R2)),
findundercat(T,CF,R1,R2).
The predicate findundercut(+General,+Reference,-Attackers,-Defeats)
is used to find the undercut relation among two sets: (1) general (the set with all
arguments) and (2) reference (a conflict free set).
The next step is to find the preferred extensions. We use the previous results,
and find the preferred extensions by looking for the maximal admissible set, in
accordance with the previous definition 7.
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4.3 DA Implementation
In order to realize the DA, we exploited TuCSoN, a logic tuple centre with pro-
grammable behaviour. Agents utter a locution bymeans of a out(move(Dialog,
AgentID,Locution)) in the tuple space. The automatic actions executed
over the commitment store are represented by the term cs(ID,out(commit(...)))—
where out could be replaced by in or rd operations.
Commitment Store
The CS class is composed of commit tuples that are put in the tuple space as
facts and arguments express in logic tuple notation.The CS could be realized by
several CAA: one private for an agent and one common for the DA and the agent
society. Each CAA has a different access policy, expressed byReSpecT reaction,
that makes the artifact readable or writable only by specific category of agents or
artifacts. The DA is connected with CAA by the likability function of TuCSoN
infrastructure provided by the link operation.
Dialog Protocol
The dialog is written in terms of tuples dialog(name,AList) where AList
is the list of actions reifying in tuple form the operators choice act(A1)+(act(A2)),
parallel par(A1,A2) and sequence A1,A2. There are two types of actions A:
1) the action act(_) expresses the locutions of communication language and 2)
the action cs(_) expresses the move versus the commitment store.
Example 5 Example of Dialog State (DP component)
dialogsession(infoseek,close)
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participant(infoseek,2)
dialog(infoseek,[act(C,opendialog(C,T)),
act(T,opendialog(C,T)),act(C,ask(Arg)+
(act(T,tell(arg1),cs(T,out(commit(arg1)))))])
currentpar(infoseek,0)
Example 5 shows a dialog protocol composed by some basic information on
dialog state and few steps of the information seeking dialog protocol. The tu-
ples that form the DP component are: participant (number of participants),
dialog (dialog protocol), dialogstate (actual protocol dialog state), and
currentpar (actual number of participant). In addition, an open dialog ses-
sion also uses tuple session(AgentID,infoseek,open) for each dialog
participant.
Interaction Control
The complete IC implementation is shown in appendix A.2, where the reactions
implementing the control of dialog interaction are presented. In particular, the
code implements the dialog state transition after an agent action, the search of next
admissible move after an agent request, and also makes the automatic interaction
with the commitment store automatically executing cs actions possible. Such
mechanisms make it possible for a dialog to be driven automatically by the state
of the commitment store. Figure 4.3 shows the ReSpecT implementation of the
nextI operator.
The engine of process algebra management is implemented exploiting a transi-
tion system defined by the predicates transition(Currentstate, Action,
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%reacts from agent next moves request
reaction(rd(nextmoves(Dialog,S)),(
rd_r(dialogstate(Dialog,S)),
out_r(findall(S,Dialog))
)).
reaction(out_r(findall(S,Dialog)),(
in_r(findall(S,Dialog)),
findall(A,transition(S,A,Q),L),%collect all next legal moves
out_r(nextmoves(Dialog,L))
)).
Figure 4.2: Implementation of nextI operator in ReSpecT
Newstate).
transition(cs(Id,A),cs(Id,A),zero).
transition(act(Id,A),act(Id,A),zero).
transition([Act],A,zero):-!,transition(Act,A,zero).
transition([Act,Act2],A,Act2):-!,transition(Act,A,zero).
transition([Act|S],A,S):-transition(Act,A,zero).
transition(S1+S2,A,R1):-transition(S1,A,R1).
transition(S1+S2,A,R2):-transition(S2,A,R2).
Future state of dialog Newstate is calculated exploiting the current action and
the current dialog state. Next admissible locutions are calculated exploiting a sec-
ond order query by findall(Object,Goal,List) predicate and by transition(S,A,Q)
predicate as Goal. Basically the findall collects in a List all the solutions
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of the query Goal.
In our engine for dialog execution the action cs are executed and consumed
automatically by the artifact. When the next admissible move is a cs action, the
ReSpecT reactions try to perform it over the right commitment store. If the action
is well executed, then the move is consumed and the dialog state consequently
advance. The actions (k-OUT, k-RD, k-IN) model an automatic interaction versus
the commitment store. They could be used as pre- or post-condition of locutions
in communication language in order to automatically conduct the dialog through
a right sequence of actions.
reaction(out_r(findall(S,Dialog)),(
in_r(findall(S,Dialog)),
findall(cs(Id,Commit),transition(S,cs(Id,Commit),Q),L),
out_r(nextmoves(Dialog,L))
)).
reaction(out_r(nextmoves(D,[H|T])),(
in_r(nextmoves(D,[H|T])),
out_r(excom(H)),
out_r(looknext(D,T))
)).
Figure 4.3: Collection of next cs actions
Figure 4.3 presents the first step of automatic action execution by collecting all the
next admissible cs moves. The next step to perform automatically the admissible
actions is implemented by the reactions presented in 4.4.
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%Automatic Action execution on the Commitment Store
reaction(out_r(excom(cs(Id,out(A)))),(
out_r(A),
in_r(excom(cs(Id,out(A)))),
in_r(dialogstate(Dialog,S)),
out_r(transition(S,cs(Id,Act),C,Dialog))
)).
reaction(out_r(excom(cs(Id,in(A)))),(
in_r(A),
out_r(excom(cs(Id,in(A)))),
in_r(dialogstate(Dialog,S)),
out_r(transition(S,cs(Id,Act),C,Dialog))
)).
reaction(out_r(excom(cs(Id,rd(A)))),(
rd_r(A),
in_r(excom(cs(Id,rd(A)))),
in_r(dialogstate(Dialog,S)),
out_r(transition(S,cs(Id,Act),C,Dialog))
)).
Figure 4.4: Automatic Action execution on the Commitment Store
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Chapter 5
Case study over ADR Systems
5.1 Overview of Alternative Dispute Resolution
In a social context conflicts are often inevitable. From a human point of view
the different culture, own interest and partial consciousness are often the causes
of disputes. People develop systems and methods in order to settle conflicts in a
fair way. They provide norm systems, infrastructures (such as court) and methods
(such as trial) to achieve the dispute resolution.
In a global business process scenario there is a increasingly necessity for a
speed-up of the processes, and for faster conflict resolution. The new systems
have to support legal process, for instance when a negotiation is broken, or to
combine mediation and legal service to avoid litigation.
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is usually considered to be alternative
to litigation. It can also be used as a colloquialism for allowing a dispute to drop
or as an alternative to violence. ADR is generally classified into at least four
subtypes: negotiation, mediation, collaborative law and arbitration. Walker and
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Daniels [42] underline that legal negotiation is a part of traditional dispute resolu-
tion system rather than a component of the ADRmovement. The legal negotiation
happens directly among agents that represent the disputants in a context similar to
courtroom.
Arguments have a central role in the process of formal legal system and in
the trial. [35] shows a survey of logic in computational model on legal argument.
It presents the main architecture of legal arguments with in background a four
layer architecture: 1) logical layer, 2) dialectical layer, 3) procedural layer and
4) strategic layer. Disputants use arguments in order to persuade the other parts
of the dispute and also the decision makers - juries, judges, clients and attorneys.
[32] considers the use of argument in ADR systems and it is presents an analysis
of arguments in different context such as arbitration, mediation and multi-party
facilitation. Argumentation plays an important part in conflict resolution system,
since it drives the ADR to obtain a successful solution of the dispute. Argumen-
tation process promotes the values of justice, equality and community that are
desirable in a dispute resolution system.
In an open agent, society holds the same role as human society: it is undesir-
able to resolve dispute by litigation. The develop of a system for internal disputes
resolution in virtual organisation is purposed by Jeremy Pitt et al in [32]. It pro-
vides a norm-government MAS and an ADR protocol specification for virtual
organization exploited by intelligent agents.
ADR supplies a theoretical bases of Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) defined
in [38]. ODR has the purpose to extend ADR process, moving it to virtual envi-
ronment and providing computation and communication support. In ODR what
is crucial is the role of technology, which used to facilitate the resolution of dis-
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putes between parties. It provides a structured communication and an informed
environment that helps the successful conclusion of the conflict.
ODR could be seen such as an instance of ADR system, communication in-
frastructure and Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques aiming at supporting the
parties towards agreements. The reasoning and argument ability of the parties are
realized by AI methods.
In this section we aim at providing a framework for conflict resolution in an
agent-based society. We want to supply a supporting infrastructure in order to
manage arguments, to retrieve information and to bargain.
In Walton and Godden [45] is shown that argument-based dialogs, in particu-
lar persuasion dialogs, contribute to the realization of effective dispute resolution
systems. The main type of dialog usually considered by ADR is negotiation, but
it could be interpreted such as a particular kind of communication for the purpose
of persuasion. In argumentation theory are present both types of dialog: persua-
sion dialog and negotiation dialog. These two types of dialog have a different
structure and different goals and in ODR systems have to be managed by different
procedural rules.
A complete classification of six primary dialogs models in which argumen-
tation occur is presented by Walton in The New Dialectic [44]. The set of these
dialogue is composed by: persuasion, inquiry, negotiation, information seeking,
deliberation and eristic. All these dialogues can be captured in an argumentation
framework [29], and they are developed strictly among two entities.
Fundamental problem in ODR and ADR systems is that it is difficult to struc-
ture and process the information that is exchanged between negotiating parties.
In order to solve this problem, we propose to build an ADR system to use A&A
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meta model with Co-Argumentation Artifact and Dialog Artifact abstraction ex-
plained in the previous sections. Our framework provides a structured information
based on logic tuple and the control of dialog processes through a mediate form
of communication over a programmable infrastructure. These two characteristics
are useful in order to build MAS in a scalable and flexible architecture and also to
build ADR that supports multi-party dialog session.
5.2 Architecture for ADR
We propose our architecture for MAS based on A&A metamodel to design a
ADR/ODR application. An ADR system, especially on-line, exploits the form
of negotiation, arbitration or mediation to achieve a solution. Typically in that
system the entities involved are more than two: two participants and a third entity
to help the dispute resolution like in mediator and arbitrator procedure. The par-
ties involved choose the procedure, terms and condition of their dispute.In [32]
are presented an arbitration protocol and concepts of decision making through
formation and voting protocol.
The parties, in order to find a solution, have the possibility to share any perti-
nent argument, make demands and evaluate the acceptability of an argument with
respect to normative context. To do that are a multi-party dialog protocol and an
impartial computation over the shared knowledge necessary. When the dispute in-
volves an increasing number of participants, it is necessary to introduce a mediate
form of communication in order to have a scalable system. Also, in the role of
mediation there are often evaluations that could be done automatically.
In that scenario our architecture provides the correct abstractions: 1) Dialog
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Artifact 2) Co-Argumentation Artifact to make a flexible system. In the DA we
store the arbitration, mediation or negotiation protocol. The parties exploit the DA
to take part in the discussion, which drives the dialog ground on the commitments.
The advantages are the management of dialog between multiple entities and the
automatic interaction with commitment/argument store. The CAA provides the
right abstraction to make a commitment/argument store and where possible, to
evaluate automatically the argument validity as to the normative context. Also,
it provides default function to exchange information, data and arguments, and to
record their public commitments in private or public form. In a bargain among
three or more entities, for instance, through a CAA the final set of arguments
stored during the bargain represent a form of contract among the parties.
In the following paragraph we focus on the persuasion dialog, that is among
the most common and useful dialog in ADR. An interesting observation in [45]
underlines that a negotiation dialog can naturally include or shift to persuasion
dialog almost in two points: 1)to follow an offer and 2) to follow a rejection of an
offer. In both cases are provided reasons (by argument) to proof the acceptability
or unaccetabilitiy of an offer. A dialog model for persuasion could be composed
of: 1) commitment store for each participant, 2) inference rule to draw conclusion
from commits in the commitment store made by the participants and 3) practical
rules that govern the sequence of locutions and their consequences.
5.3 Persuasion Dialog
In persuasion dialog the goal of a participant is to prove his thesis and to rationally
persuade the other parties. With the word “persuasion” we do not mean a psycho-
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logical persuasion, but rather a rational persuasion supported by arguments. In
Walton & Krabbe [44] they observe that disputes are a subtype of persuasion di-
alog where the parties disagree about a single proposition ϕ . At the start of the
dialog a party believes in ϕ and the other believes in ¬ϕ , therefore they have a
contrary opinion about a proposition. Generally, the moves that are allowed in
the dialog are: asking question, answering question, putting forward arguments.
Following Walton [45], a proponent in a persuasion dialog is successful when: 1)
the responded has committed all the premises of the argument 2) each argument
is corrected 3) the chain of argument has the proponent thesis as its conclusion
In [34] is presented a survey of formal systems of persuasion dialogue that
points out the crucial role of regulating interaction among agents rather than de-
sign of behaviour in individual agent within a dialogue. Among the main ap-
proaches to design persuasion dialogue and communication between agents based
on arguments, we keep inspiration from Parson and McBurney [29] approach and
Prakken [33] approach. And also from [2], where it is shown how each move
of the dialog could be specified by rational rules, dialog rules and update rules
making explicit the relation with the commitment store.
5.3.1 CAA
The CAA provides the services to read, store and consume arguments and be-
liefs such as a commitment store. And also following the general architecture
for MAS propose in 3.4 we provide a private and a public CAA. In particular
for persuasion dialog we exploit the ability of the CAA, in order to automatically
calculate arguments and beliefs acceptability following the agent attitudes and the
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argumentation semantic. In [29] are introduced agent attitudes in order to provide
some acceptability criteria. An agent may have one of three acceptance attitudes
about proposition: a credulous agent can accept any formula for which there is an
argument S, a cautious agent can accept any proposition for which there is an ar-
gument if no stronger rebutting argument exists, a skeptical agent can accept any
proposition for which there is an acceptable argument S. Exploiting our argument
definition and referring to our argumentation system, the argument acceptance is
resolved following the argumentation preferred semantics. In the context of pre-
ferred semantics the argument acceptance is divided in credulous acceptance or
sceptical acceptance, if an argument is in some/all preferred extension.
The CAA validates the arguments committed verifying their correctness and
also it evaluates their acceptability verifying which of the preferred sets it be-
longs to. In particular for persuasion dialog the CAA supports the agent attitudes
and reacts from the tuple rd(cs(Y,acceptable(Attitude,P))) where
Attitude could be credulous, cautious or skeptical, in order to ver-
ify the acceptability of P formula grounded on agent attitude.
5.3.2 DA
The DA is the abstraction that encapsulates the rules of dialog and it coordinates
the entities during the persuasion process. We follow the definition of this artifact
provided in 3.5, that supplies all components definition. We also propose a dialog
persuasion protocol formalized with our process algebra. The commitment store
of DA is provided by CAA correctly implemented, and we suppose for simplicity
that it is in the same space of the DA.
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Communication Language
The more common locutions on persuasion dialog that can be found in literature
are well collected in [34] and they are briefly listed here:
• claim ϕ (assert): The agent asserts a formula ϕ to start the persuasion.
• why ϕ (challenge): The agent asks for reasons about the ϕ formula.
• concede ϕ (accept): The agent accepts the validity of ϕ .
• reject ϕ(retract): The agent does not commit the ϕ . In some cases it retracts
the formula from the commitment store previously stored.
• S since ϕ (argue): The agent provides reasons for ϕ formula by an argu-
ment.
Our communication language is composed of the following set of locutions: as-
sert, why, accept, reject, retract, and argue.
Dialog Protocol
To make a persuasion dialog concrete, a persuasion protocol is defined, typically
among two parties: proponent and respondent. We formalize through our process
algebra a generic persuasion dialog protocol keeping inspiration from [31, 2] and
adding repetition rule proposed by [34]. Exploiting the expressive ability of the
defined process algebra we can express the agent attitude directly in the proto-
col enabling an automatic checking of those properties. The dialog is partially
driven through the state of commitment store by the actions (in, out, rd) that are
specifiable in the protocol.
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dialog_persuasion(X,Y,P):= X:assert(P).dialog_response(X,Y,P)
dialog_response(X,Y,P):=
Y:accept(P) +
Y:reject(P) +
Y:why(P).
X:argue(argument(Name,bel(B),inf(I),conc(P))).
dialog_argue(X,Y,P)
% Evaluation of chain argument support of P assertion
dialog_argue(X,Y,P):=
Y:accept(P) +
Y:reject(P) +
Y:argue(argument(Name,bel(B1),inf(I1),conc(P1))).(
X:retract(P) +
X:argue(argument(Name,bel(B2),inf(I2),conc(P2))).dialog_argue(X,Y,P)))
Figure 5.1: Persuasion dialog without interaction with the CS
In figure 5.1 is shown a dialog protocol for persuasion where an agent can
accept or reject an assertion P, based on its attitudes, by an internal evaluation of
facts and argument acceptability. Then starts a phase of arguing conclude with an
acceptance or rejection of the assertion P. The relation among dialog and commits
is not explicitly expressed. In a dialog each move could be specified by rational
rules, dialog rules and update rules [2]: the rational rules specify the preconditions
for playing a move; The update rules specify the modification of commitment
store; the dialog rules specify the next moves. With our process algebra we have
the expressive power to cover the three types of dialog rules. For instance we
propose a modified version of the persuasion protocol in the figure 5.2 where
we provide an automatic evaluation of some preconditions(rationality) and the
consequent modification of the commitment store (update). In that version of the
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dialog the DA automatically drives the sequence of action through the state of the
commitment store. In the choice points some locutions are automatically chosen.
We exploit also the ability of the CAA to find beliefs acceptability following the
agent attitudes and the argumentation semantic.
This protocol formalization is very flexible and opens a lot of courses of ac-
tions. The problems could be the termination of the dialog and the determination
of the dialog results. The dialog is partially automated through DA and CAA in-
frastructure. The agents have every time the control over their own actions and
they can decide in every moment to suspend the dialog. From the responder agent
point of view this type of dialog could be interpreted such as a dialog to build a
new argument. The new argument is composed of the tree branches from last lo-
cution to the first assertion. A new belief is accepted if there is a course of action
from the last uttered locution to the first assertion.
5.3.3 Example of Run
In this section we provide an example of simulation of a simplified version of
persuasion dialog exploiting TuCSoN infrastructure. The purpose is to show the
use of the infrastructure. In order to perform the dialog simulation TuCSoN
provides useful tools: CLIAgent to simulate agents interaction and Inspector to
inspect current state of tuple space . The Inspector tool shown in figure 5.3
allows users to observe and debug the communication state and the behaviour of a
tuple centre. In particular, it makes it possible to inspect the tuple set, the pending
query set, the triggered reaction set and the behaviour specification set.
The TuCSoN CLIAgent tool allows users to invoke the commands of the TuC-
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dialog_persuasion(X,Y,P):= X:assert(P).dialog_response(X,Y,P)
dialog_response(X,Y,P):=
rd(cs(Y,acceptable(P))).Y:accept(P) +
rd(cs(Y,acceptable(not(P)))).Y:reject(P) +
Y:why(P).X:argue(argument(Name,bel(B),inf(I),conc(P))).dialog_argue(X,Y,P).(
rd(_,acceptable(B).Y:accept(P) +
rd(_,acceptable(not(B)).X:retract(P).in(X,assert(P))
+else dialog_argue(X,Y,P)
)
% Evaluation of chain argument support of P assertion
dialog_argue(X,Y,P):=
Y:accept(P).out(Y,commit(P)) +
Y:reject(P) +
Y:argue(argument(Name,bel(B1),inf(I1),conc(P1))).(
rd(_,acceptable(B1)).out(_,commit(P1)) +
X:retract(P).in(X,assert(P))+
X:argue(argument(Name,bel(B2),inf(I2),conc(P2))).(
rd(_,acceptable(B2)).out(_,commit(P2)) +
dialog_argue(X,Y,P)
)
Figure 5.2: Persuasion dialog with CS interaction: Automatic evaluation of ac-
ceptability
SoN coordination language. For our purpose we exploit the CLIAgent to utter
agent locution in the form out(move(Dialog,Id,Locution)).
The rules to manage the dialog in the DA are programmed with the ReSpecT
code in appendix A.2, for the commitment store is considered the same tuple
space of dialog and the initial dialog state is expressed by the tuple
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Figure 5.3: Inspector tool
dialogstate(persuasion,[act(X,assert1(P)),
(act(Y,accept(P))+act(Y,reject(P)))+act(Y,assert1(non(P)))+
act(Y,why(P),act(X,argue(argument(N,bel(B),inf(I),conc(C)))),
(act(Y,accept(N))+ act(Y,reject(N)))]).
The locutions that could be uttered in that dialog are: assert, accept, reject, why,
and argue. We start the simulation sending an assert locution in the tuple centre
from agent Paul by the CLIAgent shown in the figure 5.4. After that move the
infrastructure reacts and it calculates next dialog state.
move(persuasion,paul,assert1(safe))
dialogstate(persuasion,
[’+’(’+’(’+’(act(_4,accept(safe)),act(_4,reject(safe))),
act(_4,assert1(non(safe)))),act(_4,why(safe))),
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Figure 5.4: CLIAgent
act(paul,argue(argument(_3,bel(_2),inf(_1),conc(_0)))),
’+’(act(_4,accept(_3)),act(_4,reject(_3)))])
The responder agentOlga can ask the tuple rd(nextlocutions(persuasion,L))for
the possible admissible next locutions and the tuple centre responds by new tuple
nextlocution.
nextlocution(persuasion,
[act(_2,accept(safe)),act(_2,reject(safe)),
act(_1,assert1(non(safe))),act(_0,why(safe))])
At this point the responder chooses a move either from the state of commitment
store or independently from our knowledge base, for instance in this case the
choice could be why(safe). The figure 5.5 shows the state of the tuple centre
after Olga locution by the inspector tool. The new dialogstate expresses the
remaining locution constrained by previous logical unification of paul and olga
identifiers.
dialogstate(persuasion,[act(paul,
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argue(argument(_3,bel(_2),inf(_1),conc(_0)))),
’+’(act(olga,accept(_3)),act(olga,reject(_3)))])
Figure 5.5: Tuple Set
5.4 Argument Acceptance
A tool to find argument socially acceptable could be useful in ADR process. The
key idea is to form a common knowledge acknowledged by all the participants
whereby the parties or third figures such as mediator, arbitrator or attorney use to
resolve their disputes. In a collaborative divorce, for instance, the parties look for
an agreement with the support of the attorneys. No one imposes a resolution on
the parties. An automatic evaluation of argument agreement could be useful in
order to speed up the solution or may eliminate in similar cases the figure of the
attorneys. More easily we present a example of dispute resolution among friend
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that have to choose the activity of Saturday night.
We present an application of CAA in a multi-agent context where agents have
to decide whether their arguments are socially acceptable. We use the argumenta-
tion system presented in Section 2.2 with preferred semantics, and either credu-
lous or sceptical acceptance. An argument is considered as accepted in the cred-
ulous definition if it is contained at least in one preferred extension, and in the
sceptical definition if it is contained in every preferred extension. In [5] an algo-
rithm is presented that resolves the credulous and the sceptical decision problems
based on an argumentation game formalised with a dialog between two entities.
The algorithm could be applied either inside each agent simulating a dialog game,
or between two agents. In order to extend the solution to N agents, we propose to
use the A&A meta-model by adopting the CAA abstraction.
We foresee a scenario where a group of agents argue about what to do on
Saturday night. For instance, the agents are conditioned from the past history of
the place where to go, or the possible company. Each agent has its arguments
about whether to go or not to go to, say, the El Farol Bar. In order to make a
personal evaluation the agents may benefit from social information that could be
retrieved asking other agents. Besides, when the agents share their arguments, a
form of social knowledge is implicitly generated, which provides agents with a
social point of view on the Saturday night problem. Also, sharing knowledge and
arguments gives the group more chances to take congruent decisions.
More generally, social contexts typically introduce the need to represent and
store social knowledge. Since shared, social knowledge belongs in principle to
every agent, so to no agent in particular, it should be stored and maintained outside
agents: in short, this is what makes it useful to introduce in this scenario the
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notion of artifact, as an abstraction that agents can use to share, compare and store
information.
Here, we consider agents with different knowledge bases composed only of
arguments, and an empty CAA only containing the algorithms proposed in the
argumentation component. The arguments acceptance is driven generally by a
system process divide in to three sequential steps. First, the agents share their
own arguments writing the arguments in the CAA. Secondly, the CAA reacts and
calculates the conflict free and preferred extension over the shared arguments.
Thirdly and finally, the agents evaluate credulous or sceptical acceptability based
on common sets calculated in the CAA. Then, each agent can consult the CAA
to understand the “social acceptability” of its own arguments, but also the other
agent’s arguments, and possibly deliberate its course of action based on a shared
view of arguments. Also, the CAA keeps track of the overall argumentation pro-
cess, and could be exploited by an external observer to understand the social be-
haviour of agents sharing arguments and behaving accordingly.
In particular, in our example the CAA is implemented as a TuCSoN tuple
centre called saturdayNight, which processes and combines knowledge ex-
pressed by arguments from various agents. In Table 5.1 the arguments possessed
and shared by the three agents are shown. Some arguments are in favor of going
out if the conclusion is play(1), or vice versa is play(-1). The support of
conclusions should contain the motivation to do the choice, for instance: a fa-
vorite kind of music music(rock), a previous nice night result(1) or a
good company willgo(susan). Different sets of arguments represent differ-
ent opinions and motivations that bring an agent to make a decision. The sharing
of the arguments enables the composition and completion of the information.
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The sets calculated in CAA are expressed with the tuples conflictfreeset,
admissibleset and preferredset and calculated using the algorithm ex-
plained in section 3.4. An external observer can look inside the CAA through
the Inspector utility provide by TuCSoN, and consult the argument sets. In the
following we show the sets computed after the last argument insertion. The sets
contains the argument names.
conflicfreeset([[argB,argC,argD,musicB,companyB,dayA,dayB,typemusic],
[argB,argC,argD,musicB,companyB,day,dayA,typemusic],
[argB,argC,argD,music,companyB,dayA,dayB],
[argB,argC,argD,music,companyB,day,dayA],
[argA,companyA,day,typemusic],
[argA,music,musicA,companyA,day]])
admissibleset([[argB,argC,argD,companyB,dayA,typemusic],
[argB,argC,argD,companyB,day,dayA,typemusic],
[argB,argC,argD,music,companyB,dayA],
[argB,argC,argD,music,companyB,day,dayA],
[argA,companyA,day,typemusic],
[argA,music,companyA,day]])
preferredset([[argA,music,companyA,day],
[argA,companyA,day,typemusic],
[argB,argC,argD,music,companyB,day,dayA],
[argB,argC,argD,companyB,day,dayA,typemusic]])
One should observe that the global preferred sets are different from the ones that
each agent could calculate based on its own arguments only. Agents could then
read the preferredset tuple, and verify in which set its own arguments occur.
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agent1, for instance, may want to consider the social acceptability of argument
musicB that in its own knowledge is accepted, because the argument belong
to their own preferred set ([argB,argC,day,musicB]). Vice versa, when
considering the common preferred extension, the argument is no longer (socially)
acceptable because it does not belong to a common set. These sets are calculated
from more information than the ones available to each individual agent, and in
some context they could be considered as more reliable. In any case, agents can
autonomously decide what to do with such information—either use it or ignore it.
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Table 5.1: Arguments by Agent1, Agent2, and Agent3
Agent1
argument(argB,1,beliefs(facts([result(-1)])),infer(t),conclusion([play(-1)])).
argument(argC,1,beliefs(facts([result(1)])),infer(t),conclusion([play(-1)])).
argument(day,1,beliefs(facts([today(sunday)])),infer(t),conclusion([today(sunday)])).
argument(musicB,1,beliefs(facts([non(music(rock))])),infer(t),conclusion([play(-1)])).
argument(dayB,1,beliefs(facts([non(today(sunday))])),infer(t),conclusion([play(-1)])).
. . .
Agent2
argument(music,1,beliefs(facts([music(rock)])),infer(t),conclusion([music(rock)])).
argument(argD,1,beliefs(facts([result(-1)])),infer(t),conclusion([play(-1)])).
argument(companyA,2,beliefs(facts([willgo(susan)])),infer(t),conclusion([play(1)])).
argument(companyB,2,beliefs(facts([non(willgo(susan))])),infer(t),conclusion([play(-1)])).
argument(musicA,1,beliefs(facts([music(rock)])),infer(t),conclusion([play(1)])).
. . .
Agent3
argument(argA,1,beliefs(facts([result(1)])),infer(t),conclusion([play(1)])).
argument(typemusic,1,beliefs(facts([imtired(yes)])),infer(t),conclusion([non(music(rock))])).
argument(dayA,1,beliefs(facts([today(sunday)])),infer(t),conclusion([play(-1)])).
argument(company,1,beliefs(facts([willgo(susan)])),infer(t),conclusion([willgo(susan)])).
. . .
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Related works and Discussion
In literature there are several logical models to formalize reasoning among argu-
ments that are called by Prakken and Vreeswijka in [36] Argumentation Systems.
Different logical models of arguments formalize “commonsense” reasoning. For
instance giving rise to two conflicting arguments, accepting some premises or
building a counterargument could be considered commonsense reasoning. They
are typically human actions whence to study inference patterns.
To represent our arguments we use a meta logic approach based on first order
logic (FOL) where the conflicts and reasoning are computed at argument level.
The arguments are build with classical inference exploiting monotonic logic and
the commonsense reasoning is brought at the meta level. We follow an abstract
framework for defeasible argumentation developed in several articles from Dung
et al [10] that is a completely abstract version of Bondarenko et al [4] framework.
Another approach to build arguments is based on defeasible logic. It is a
73
non-monotonic logic that provides directly at language level three types of special
rules to model undercutting, rebuttal and defeater relation to express conflicts. The
fitness of defeasible logic for argumentation is stressed out by Governatori et al
in [15] and Garcia et al [12]. Moreover, there are also some other approaches that
extend defeasible logic and normal logic adding probability and certainty factors,
[16] in order to increase the expressiveness, and modalities to weight arguments,
[8] in order to resolve conflicts. An unifying approach to computational models
of argument using Labelled Deductive Systems (LDS) is proposed in [7].
Argumentation-based communication between agents is exploited to define
forms of rationality that drive the agents to accept or reject statements. Different
dialog formalizations are presented by Prakken et al [33] and Parsons et al [31],
both based on arguments. Walton and Krabbe in [44] presents six main type of dia-
log: persuasion, inquiry, negotiation, information seeking, deliberation and eristic
that can be captured in a argumentation framework as that one presented in [31].
Our dialog formalization is based on process algebra. We exploit a dialog system
similar to the generic framework for dialog presented by Maudet et al in [19].
We use a common and private board (mediator artifacts) to represent commitment
stores, the rules of dialog expressed by a process algebra with commitment store
interaction and the inferences automatically calculated by the infrastructure. We
present a formalization of some of these mediator artifact functions drawing on
the theory of communications artifacts in multi-agent systems [25, 41]. In ear-
lier work [22], we presented a conceptual framework for a central co-ordinating
entity in an argumentation dialog, called a Co-Argumentation Artifact (CAA), to
provide co-ordination services to the participating agents.
There is also the line of research based on argumentation schemes by Walton
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[43], which tries to decrease the gap between human linguistic argumentation and
logic based approaches. The main drawback consists in the hardness of building
computational models for them. Rahwan et al [37] wrote an interesting paper
that drives a new direction of argumentation theory in the context of World Wide
Web application. It extends the Argument Interchange Format (AIF) [6] ontology
with Argumentation Schemes [43], in order to use both logic-based reasoning and
schemes based reasoning. We share with AIF a very similar definition of argument
composed of three components: beliefs, inference rules and conclusions. Our
meta logic approach with implementation in TuCSoN infrastructure fits very well
in the new application scenario of AIF ontology. An ontology expressed by RDF
meta data model could be equivalently represented in FOL and reified in tuple
form in the tuple center. In this way we can exploit by our artifacts all the AIF-
RDF ontology power, opening new innovative scenarios. For instance agent and
humans could collaborate exchanging arguments in WWAW context through a
Co-Argumentation Artifact. Moreover, our meta reasoning approach emerge to
be very useful to reason over the set of web arguments. The use of TuCSoN
coordination model inside a web architecture is already introduced by Omicini et
al in the paper [28].
6.2 Conclusions
In this thesis we have presented a completed work from theory to implementa-
tion level. At the theory level we define a formal argumentation and dialog sys-
tem following respectively a meta logic approach based on FOL and an algebraic
approach based on process algebra representation. At the model level following
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A&Ameta-model for MAS we have proposed a conceptual architecture for multi-
agent argumentation system in which the agents are assisted by an automatic me-
diation, provided by Co-Argumentation Artifact and Dialog Artifact abstraction.
At the coding level we reported on a prototype implementation of these ideas
exploiting programmable Tuple Space framework TuCSoN. We provide an im-
plementation of the desired functionality of the two artifacts. The case study of
ADR shows how it can efficiently applicate our system on an agent-based con-
text. ODR extends ADR moving it to the virtual environment of the Internet.
Exploiting TuCSoN infrastructure we provide a framework that enables the dis-
pute resolution on the Internet and an automatic mediation that makes the dispute
resolution process easier. The persuasion dialog and argument acceptance are two
concrete realizations of ADR/ODR systems.
6.3 Further Research
In future work, we want to promote a formalization of argument composition of
different type of arguments with dfferent inference rules. We hope to instrument
an appropriate artifact to safely combine, if possible, arguments based on different
inference rules such as strict and presumptive.
Moreover, we hope to formalize more of the potential functions of the me-
diator which we listed above in Section 3.5. Some of these functions will be
straightforward to formalize, to identify conflicts between commitments or pro-
vide automated alerts to agents concerning upcoming dialogs. Others, however,
such as run-time assignment of rights and responsibilities to dialog participants,
will be more challenging.
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Finally, we desire to concretely open the possibility to add, in our artifacts,
arguments based on presumptive inference, and to generalize our argument rep-
resentation with the AIF ontology. The vision is to validate presumptive argu-
ment through an automatic revision of critical questions. We aim at obtaining an
advanced tool for a WWAW based on artifact, where agents and humans could
indistinctly interact.Our tool encapsulates and consistently handles the evolution
of Web social knowledge based on argument ontology, and it provides agents and
humans with an instrument to dialog and to enhance their ability to deal with their
own partial knowledge.
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Appendix A
Implementation and Example
A.1 Example of Prolog Meta-Interpreter for legal
reasoning
In this section a meta-interpreter is proposed written in Prolog for the production
of legal argument. That program follows the idea presented by Trevor et al in [3].
We exploit a labelled theory term:label to record the extra logic information
require to organize the explanation. The labels class, data, condition,
qual identify different roles of Prolog clauses and the results of computation are
a set of arguments based on Stephen Toulmin argument schema.
%Labelled theory
age(john,80).
male(john).
greater_than(A,70):condition :-
A > 70.
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man(X):-
human(X):class,
male(X):data.
old(X) :-
man(X):class,
age(X,A):data,
greater_than(A,70):condition,
not(tibetan(X)):qual.
%Meta-iterpreter for argument generation
body_list(’,’(Goal,OtherGoals),[Goal|L]) :-
body_list(OtherGoals,L).
body_list(LastGoal,[LastGoal]).
make_arguments([Goal|OtherGoals],C):-
argument(Goal,C),
make_arguments(OtherGoals,C).
make_arguments([],C).
argument(’:’(G,class),C):- C1 is C+1,clause(G,B),
B=\=true,meta(G,C1),nl,write(context(C,G,C1)),!.
argument(’:’(G,class),C):- nl,write(context(C,G)),!.
argument(’:’(G,data),C):- G,nl,write(data(C,G)),!.
argument(’:’(G,qual),C):- G,nl,write(rebuttal(C,G)),!.
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%argument(’:’(G,condition),C):- nl, write(’condition’),!.
argument(G,C).
%warrant.claim,if,data,cond
correct_type(G,data).
correct_type(G,condition).
append1([],L,L).
append1([H|T],L,[H|O]):-append1(T,L,O).
make_worrant([],[]).
make_worrant([’:’(Goal,Type)|OthersGoals],[Goal|R]):-
correct_type(Goal,Type),!,
make_worrant(OthersGoals,R).
make_worrant([_|OthersGoals],Lout):-
make_worrant(OthersGoals,Lout).
type_basis(G,data).
type_basis(G,condition).
type_basis(G,class).
make_basis([],[]).
make_basis([’:’(Goal,Type)|OthersGoals],[Goal|R]):-
type_basis(Goal,Type),!,
make_basis(OthersGoals,R).
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make_basis([_|OthersGoals],Lout):-
make_basis(OthersGoals,Lout).
make_worrants(Claim,Count,Lin,Lout) :-
make_worrant(Lin,Lout),!,
append1([Claim,if],Lout,Lout1),
nl,write(warrant(Count,Lout1)),
make_basis(Lin,LoutB),
append1([Claim,if],LoutB,LoutB1),
nl,write(basis(Count,LoutB1)).
%qual-rebuttal
%class-context
%data-data
meta_interpreter(G):-
tell(’argument.pl’),
meta(G,1),!,
told.
meta(X,C) :-
clause(X,B),
nl,write(claim(C,X)),
body_list(B,L),!,
make_arguments(L,C),
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clause(X,B1),
body_list(B1,L1),!,
make_worrants(X,C,L1,A).
We exec the following java command the labeled theory java -cp 2p.jar;./
alice.tuprolog.Agent meta.pl meta_interpreter(old(john)).
and we generate a list of possible arguments that follow Toulmin schema.
claim(1,old(john))
claim(2,man(john))
context(2,human(john))
data(2,male(john))
warrant(2,[man(john),if,male(john)])
basis(2,[man(john),if,human(john),male(john)])
context(1,man(john),2)
data(1,age(john,80))
rebuttal(1,not(tibetan(john)))
warrant(1,[old(john),if,age(john,_142),
greater_than(_142,70)])
basis(1,[old(john),if,man(john),age(john,_142),
greater_than(_142,70)])
A.2 ReSpecT Implementation of DA
The Control of Interaction: Checking agent legal locution, Making dialog proto-
col transition and executing automatically cs actions are the basic function here
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implemented in ReSpecT.
transition(cs(Id,A),cs(Id,A),zero).
transition(act(Id,A),act(Id,A),zero).
transition([Act],A,zero):-
!,transition(Act,A,zero).
transition([Act,Act2],A,Act2):-
!,transition(Act,A,zero).
transition([Act|S],A,S):-transition(Act,A,zero).
transition(S1+S2,A,R1):-transition(S1,A,R1).
transition(S1+S2,A,R2):-transition(S2,A,R2).
%Start reaction
reaction(out(move(Dialog,Id,Act)),(
in_r(dialogstate(Dialog,S)),
out_r(transition(S,act(Id,Act),C,Dialog))
)).
reaction(out_r(transition(S,A,S1,Dialog)),(
transition(S,A,S2), %make the state transition
in_r(transition(S,A,S1,Dialog)),
out_r(dialogstate(Dialog,S2)),
out_r(findall(S2,Dialog))
)).
reaction(out_r(findall(S,Dialog)),(
in_r(findall(S,Dialog)),
%collect all next commits
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findall(cs(Id,Commit),transition(S,cs(Id,Commit),Q),L),
out_r(nextcsmoves(Dialog,L))
)).
reaction(out_r(nextcsmoves(D,[H|T])),(
in_r(nextcsmoves(D,[H|T])),
out_r(excommit(H)), %call execution commit
out_r(looknext(D,T))
)).
reaction(out_r(looknext(D,[E])),(
in_r(looknext(D,T)),
out_r(nextcsmoves(D,T))
)).
reaction(out_r(looknext(D,T)),(
T==[], in_r(looknext(D,[])),
in_r(nextcsmoves(D,[]))
)).
%Implementation of K-OUT, K-IN and K-RD
reaction(out_r(excommit(cs(Id,out(A)))),(
out_r(A), in_r(excommit(cs(Id,out(A)))),
in_r(dialogstate(Dialog,S)),
out_r(transition(S,cs(Id,Act),C,Dialog))
)).
reaction(out_r(excommit(cs(Id,in(A)))),(
in_r(A), out_r(excommit(cs(Id,in(A)))),
in_r(dialogstate(Dialog,S)),
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out_r(transition(S,cs(Id,Act),C,Dialog))
)).
reaction(out_r(excommit(cs(Id,rd(A)))),(
rd_r(A), in_r(excommit(cs(Id,rd(A)))),
in_r(dialogstate(Dialog,S)),
out_r(transition(S,cs(Id,Act),C,Dialog))
)).
A.3 ReSpecT Implementation of CAA
In this appendix we provide the complete code for CAA functionality. The pro-
cedures to calculate argument sets (conflict free set, admissible set and preferred
extension) are called by ReSpecT reaction. The first reaction is fired by agents
putting an argument in the CAA. The CAA reacts collecting all arguments present
in the tuple space and using that list to calculate the argument sets. The use of
ReSpecT reaction in A&A perspective is well explained by Omicini in [23].
reaction(out_r(argument(Name,_,beliefs(facts(F),
rules(R)),infer(_),conclusion([C]))),(
pre,
out_r(rdall_collect(argument(Name1,_,beliefs
(facts(F1),rules(R1)),infer(_),conclusion([C1])),
[])),
in_r(out_r(argument(Name,_,beliefs(facts(F),
rules(R)),infer(_),conclusion([C])))
)).
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reaction(out_r(rdall_collect(T,L)),(
current_tuple(rdall_collect(T1,_)),
in_r(T1), %leggo la tupla dal tuple space
in_r(rdall_collect(T,L)),
out_r(rdall_collect(T,[T1|L])))).
reaction(out_r(rdall_collect(T,_)),(
current_tuple(rdall_collect(T1,_)),
no_r(T1),
in_r(rdall_collect(T,L)),
out_r(start(L)),
out_r(rdall_restore(L)) )).
reaction(out_r(rdall_restore([])),(
in_r(rdall_restore([])),
)).
reaction(out_r(rdall_restore([H|T])),(
in_r(rdall_restore([H|T])),
out_r(H),
out_r(rdall_restore(T)) )).
%calculation of preferred extension
reaction(out_r(start(TotalARg)),(
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not(turn(TotalArg)),
rd_r(mem(ConflictFreeSet)),
assert(mem(ConflictFreeSet)),
out_r(conflicfreeset(ConflictFreeSet)),
preferred(TotalArg,ConflictFreeSet,PreferredSet),
out_r(admissibleset(PreferredSet)),
eliminatesubset(PreferredSet,PreferredSet,[],_,Preferredmaxset),
out_r(preferredset(Preferredmaxset))
)).
contrary(non(P),P):-!.
contrary(P,non(P)).
%append1([1,2],[6,7],X). - X / [1,2,6,7]
append1(L1,L2,L3) :- L1=[], L3=L2.
append1(L1,L2,L3) :- L1=[H1|T1],
append1(T1,L2,T3), L3=[H1|T3].
add2end(X,[H|T],[H|NewT]):-add2end(X,T,NewT).
add2end(X,[],[X]).
%give back a element of the list and
%the rest in order [a,b,c,d]-> a [b,c,d]
selection(X,[X|Rest],Rest).
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selection(X,[Head|List],Rest) :-
selection(X,List,Rest).
subset([A|X],Y) :- member(A,Y),subset(X,Y).
subset([],Y). % The empty set is a subset of every set.
%notsubset(+List,+List)
notsubsetset(R,[H|T]):-
not(subset(R,H)),
notsubsetset(R,T).
notsubsetset(_,[]).
turn(ArgumentSet):-
selection(Name,ArgumentSet,RestArgumentSet),
argument(Name,_,beliefs(facts(F),rules(R)),_,conclusion(C)),
newconflictfree(RestArgumentSet,Result,F,C,[Name]).
newconflictfree(Arguments,Result,Facts,Conclusions,ConflictFree):-
selection(Name,Arguments,RestArguments),
argument(Name,_,beliefs(facts(F),rules(R)),_,conclusion(C)),
check(Facts,F,Conclusions,C),
append1(Facts,F,NewFacts),
append1(Conclusions,C,NewConclusions),
add2end(Name,ConflictFree,NewConflictFree),
newconflictfree(RestArguments,NewConflictFree,
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NewFacts,NewConclusions,NewConflictFree).
check(FL,F,CL,C):-
not(control(FL,C)),
not(control(F,CL)),
not(control(CL,C)).
newconflictfree(_,[],_,_,_):-!,fail.
newconflictfree(_,R,_,_,_):-
mem(P),
notsubsetset(R,P),
retract(mem(P)),
assert(mem([R|P])),!,
mem(P1),
fail.
removelist([],L,L).
removelist([H|T],List1,Result):-
delete(H,List1,R),
removelist(T,R,Result).
eliminatesubset([],CF,L,_,L).
eliminatesubset([H|T],CF,Newset,Sol,R):-
delete(H,CF,NewS),
(notsubsetset(H,NewS)->Sol=[H|Newset];Sol=Newset),
eliminatesubset(T,CF,Sol,Result,R).
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preferred(_,[],[]).
preferred(TotalArguments,[ConflictFreeSet|Rest],Solution):-
findundercat(TotalArguments,ConflictFreeSet,Attacker,Defeat),
%to find set of attacker to conflict free
findundercat(ConflictFreeSet,Attacker,AttackerFromCF,DefeatOut),
%it find the defend argument that block the attack
removelist(DefeatOut,Attacker,AttackerNotDefeat),
findundercat(AttackerNotDefeat,Defeat,AF,DF),
removelist(DF,ConflictFreeSet,Sol),
Solution=[Sol|Result],
preferred(TotalArguments,Rest,Result).
findundercat([],_,[],[]):-!.
findundercat([H|T],CF,A,D):-
argument(H,_,beliefs(facts(F),rules(R)),infer(_),conclusion([C])),
contrary(C,P),!,
(argument(Element,_,
beliefs(facts([P]),rules(_)),infer(_),conclusion(_))->
(member(Element,CF)->
(A=[H|R1],D=[Element|R2]);(A=R1,D=R2));(A=R1,D=R2)),
findundercat(T,CF,R1,R2).
control([],_):-fail,!.
control([T|C],C2):-
90
contrary(T,CT),
(member(CT,C2)->true;
(control(C,C2))).
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